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   Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), Consignment Inventory (CI) and a combination of 
both (C&VMI) are supply-chain sourcing agreements between a vendor and customer. VMI 
allows the vendor to initiate orders on behalf of the customer. In CI, the customer pays for 
the goods supplied by the vendor only upon use. The vendor under C&VMI decides 
customer-replenishments, and owns the goods replenished until they are deployed by the 
customer. Our thesis studies these agreements in three essays.  
   The first essay considers a vendor V that manufactures a particular product at a unique 
location. That item is sold to a single retailer, the customer C. Three cases are treated in 
detail: Independent decision making (no agreement between the parties); VMI, whereby the 
supplier V initiates orders on behalf of C; and Central decision making (both Vendor and 
Customer are controlled by the same corporate entity). 
   Values of some cost parameters may vary between the three cases, and each case may 
cause a different actor to be responsible for particular expenses. Under a constant demand 
rate, optimal solutions are obtained analytically for the customer’s order quantity, the 
vendor’s production quantity, hence the parties’ individual and total costs in the three cases. 
Inequalities are obtained to delineate those situations in which VMI is beneficial. 
   The problem setting in the second essay is the same with that of Essay 1, but the 
sourcing agreements investigated are now CI and C&VMI. In CI, as in the usual 
independent-sourcing approach, the customer has authority over the timing and quantity of 
replenishments. CI seems to favour the customer because, in addition, he pays for the goods 
only upon use. Under a C&VMI agreement, the vendor still owns the goods at the customer’s 
premises, but at least can determine how much to store there.  
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   The second essay thus contrasts the cases CI and C&VMI, and compares each of them 
to a no-agreement case. General conditions under which those cases create benefits for the 
vendor, the customer and the whole chain are determined.  
         Essay 3 investigates VMI and C&VMI separately for a vendor and multiple customers 
who face time-varying, but deterministic demand for a single product. In any of those 
agreements, the vendor seeks the best set of customers to achieve economies of scale. MIP 
models are developed to find that set of customers, and to determine the vendor’s optimal 
production, transportation, and customer-replenishment quantities. The model for VMI is 
solved using a heuristic that produces two sub-models, and uses hierarchical solution 
approach for production, customer-replenishment and transportation decisions. C&VMI 
model is solved using Lagrangian relaxation. Various numerical examples are used to test the 
solution approaches used.   
          In the mean time, the customers can guarantee to be no worse off under VMI or 
C&VMI than the no-agreement case by setting the right levels of maximum inventory. A 
model to determine those levels and a solution algorithm are also proposed in Essay 3.    
   The first two essays can help a vendor or customer in a supply chain to determine the 
least costly sourcing option, which depends on the relative values of various cost parameters. 
A vendor with multiple customers can make use of the results in the third essay, which reveal 
the best possible economies of scale under VMI or C&VMI. Those customers can guarantee 
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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Coordinating the Operations in a Supply Chain           
           The essential operational processes of a firm in industry are sourcing (procurement of 
required materials), making (production of goods using the sourced materials), and delivering 
(transportation of those goods to customers). One of the main concerns of every company 
involved in a supply chain is to plan these processes, and to minimize its operational costs 
while maintaining the best possible efficiency.            
          A supply chain describes the flow of materials and information from suppliers through 
manufacturing plants and depots to customers. In general, a supply chain is thus a network 
whose nodes represent locations of suppliers or members of the chain that carry out 
processing or manufacturing operations. Each arc denotes a flow of materials and 
information between nodes.   
          Consider a simple example of a supply chain (Figure 1.1), in which node V is the 
vendor or supplier of materials or products to a customer, C.   The customer’s processes are 
composed of planning his requirements, sourcing goods from the vendor, and releasing those 
goods to end-consumers. The vendor, who similarly plans her requirements, sources 
materials/parts for production, manufactures goods, and releases those goods to the customer. 




Figure 1.1: Independent decision making in a supply chain: V vendor, C customer 
End-Consumer 





               Although part of a supply chain, a firm may still focus on optimizing its own costs. 
In that case, the decisions concerning production, purchase and shipment are made separately 
and independently by members of that chain. When put into a sequence of events, the 
customer first develops his requirements plan and sourcing method based on his costs. The 
vendor then reacts to fulfill the customer’s requirements.  
          As a result, replenishment decisions made by the customer do not necessarily consider 
its upstream business-partner’s preferences. His choices of the quantity and timing of 
replenishments may create inflexibility in the vendor’s operations, resulting in higher costs 





           
 
Figure 1.2: The supply chain between the vendor and the customer: The primary operations 
that are   interrelated are the customer’s plan and source choices, and the corresponding make and 
deliver decisions of the vendor. 
 
          It is therefore important to align the decisions in a supply chain, even when its 
members have different operational goals. In fact, performance of that chain depends not 
only on how well each member manages its operational processes, but also on how well the 
members coordinate their decisions (Achabal et al. 2000).  Coordinated decision making 
(Figure 1.3) may reduce the need for inventories and lower the shipping costs, or enable 
improved utilization of resources at the manufacturer.  
   Make    Deliver     Plan    Source 
Vendor’s Facility Customer’s Facility  
Goods 
   Make     Plan    Deliver    Source 







           Various degrees of coordination are possible, depending on the business arrangement 
between the vendor and customer. Papers included in Tayur et al. (1999) discuss a number of 
such arrangements. One example, Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), will be the main 
subject of this thesis. 
          Authors such as Karonis (1997) or Szymankiewicz (1997) have emphasized strategic 
partnerships between a manufacturer and retailer. The parties would work together, as a team, 
to maximize supply-chain efficiency. The common goal is to deliver better value to the 
customer. This would be achieved by coordinated decision making to enable smooth 
movement of product from manufacturer to customer, as in Continuous Replenishment 
Programs, or CRP (e.g. Kurt Salmon Associates, 1993).  




Figure 1.3: Coordinated decision making in a supply chain: V vendor, C customer 
 
            Coordinating the decisions by means of vertical and horizontal integration, where one 
supply chain member acquires the others or various members merge, is regarded as a 
traditional approach that often fails (Aviv and Federgruen 1998). The reasons stem from the 
organizational difficulties in integrating independent players and from different 
organizational cultures and incentives.  
           Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) emerged in the late 1980’s as a partnership to 
coordinate replenishment decisions in a supply chain while maintaining the independence of 
chain members. An important part of continuous replenishment program (CRP), VMI is also 
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referred to as a program of supplier-managed inventory, or direct replenishment. In this 
partnership between a vendor and customer, it is the vendor that decides when and in what 
quantity the customer’s stock is replenished. With such an agreement, the vendor may be 
able to share the customer’s point-of-sale and inventory-level data.              
          From the vendor’s perspective, VMI entails (e.g. Intentia, 2001):  
• Receiving (through EDI, fax or the internet) information on customer stock levels, 
sales, and any sales forecasts that have been made  
• Generating replenishment orders as needed 
• Sending dispatch advice (electronically) to the customer, and then the invoice.  
            The VMI agreement may also specify a consignment inventory (CI), whereby the 
customer will not be invoiced right at shipment, but only after selling the goods to its end 
consumer. Whether part of VMI or not, CI thus leaves ownership of the products shipped 
with the vendor, until the customer sells those items. Hence, the consignment inventory is not 
shown as an asset on the customer’s books, and the inventory turnover ratio will be higher. 
          Intentia (2001) has summarized the benefits possible under VMI. Not only does a 
customer obtain relief from placing a purchase order, but he/she may increase the inventory 
turns while being guaranteed a service level. The vendor can potentially enhance the gross 
margin by reducing the costs of manufacturing (a stabilized schedule via lessened demand-
uncertainty) and transportation (economies of scale in shipment quantities).   
          Successful VMI arrangements include Wal-Mart/Procter & Gamble (Waller et al., 
1999), Campbell Soup Company (Clark, 1994), Barilla SpA (Hammond, 1994), Intel 
(Kanellos, 1998) and Shell Chemical (Hibbard 1998).  
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           However, there are many who question whether VMI is beneficial. For example, 
Burke (1996) claims that vendors are unwillingly forced into a VMI agreement by powerful 
customers. Saccomano (1997) argues that VMI is just a way to transfer the risks involved in 
inventory management from customers to vendors. Betts (1994) mentions that the vendor 
may be overwhelmed since, to make VMI work, more technological investment is required 
there than at the customer.  According to Copacino (1993), a poorly designed VMI 
agreement can harm the supplier who ships more often to satisfy the inventory turns required 
at the retailer.   
           Disputes over the benefits of VMI stem from the fact that few quantitative analyses 
are available. General attributes of those agreements are fully understood in only some 
settings, making it difficult to assess and justify even conceptual models of VMI contracts.  
            In Section 1.2, we thus summarize information gathered through our industry 
contacts. An overall qualitative evaluation of VMI agreements is presented in Section1.3. In 
light of these two sections, we then define the problems undertaken and our research scope in 
Section 1.4. Thesis outline is described in Section 1.5.  
  
1.2 VMI/CI Examples from Industry  
          Siemens Automation and Drives, Controls and Distribution (A&D CD) in 
Germany supplies products, systems and solutions, starting from switching devices for load 
feeders or for power distribution, via control circuit devices, through to complete cabinet 
systems. The Purchasing department of Siemens A&D CD considers a full range of sourcing 
methods including VMI and CI.  
        Their “Standard Parts Management” requires the supplier to manage the planning and 
control of inventory. They usually consider low cost items for this type of sourcing.  The 
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company emphasizes the importance of collaboration when the sourcing type is CI, which is 
perceived as a very effective way to reduce inventory costs. CI is used more for items with 
high purchasing volume.   
        Parmalat Canada, which offers milk and dairy products, fruit juices, table spreads and 
cookies, is one of the country’s largest food companies. Parmalat manages the inventory of 
its products sold to customers who have agreed to a VMI relationship. Those customers take 
possession of the goods, as received on their premises. 
        The company has control over how much to ship to the customer and when. Through the 
VMI agreement, both parties set targets for service-levels as well as inventory turns. These 
measures are reviewed periodically by the customer to ensure effective management of stock. 
The firm has reduced costs through more effective truck utilization and stable production.  
          Arcelik-Eskisehir is Turkey’s largest cooling-compressor plant, established in 1975. 
Besides meeting domestic demand, the company exports an important part of its products. 
Although there is not a formal VMI agreement, one or more representatives of the supplier of 
semi-finished products visit Arcelik periodically to view stock levels and report unexpected 
fluctuations in manufacturing. The aim is to synchronise the vendor’s manufacturing with 
Arcelik’s, who is responsible for periodic orders.  
           The company is not in favour of VMI because of the complexity of products and 
automated production (that the vendor may not handle) and unwillingness to share related 
information. The firm has a “well running” MRP and “already very low” ordering costs 
through improved technology. While Arcelik seeks increased inventory turns, it believes that 
VMI will not change system requirements but only ownership of inventory.  
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           Eti-group is the second-largest food company in Turkey, producing and distributing 
biscuits, chocolate, and chewing-gum products to its retailers. The company has initiated 
VMI agreements with its vendor, who agreed to build its own depot at Eti-group’s 
manufacturing site. In this case, the vendor will handle ordering, and the customer will not 
pay for goods until they are taken from the depot and used in a manufacturing line.  
           Tepe Home is a large home-improvement retailer in Turkey. It sells decoration 
products and also manufactures its own brand of home/office furniture.  For the suppliers of 
known brands, the firm uses a VMI agreement where a representative of the vendor is 
responsible for ordering. In this case, the customer Tepe Home allocates space and 
sometimes owns the goods, sometimes not. For small-unknown brands, Tepe Home also uses 
CI, where now the customer is responsible for ordering but makes no payment to the vendor 
until goods are sold. The firm comments that both types of agreements are easy to implement 
for independent products, but CI is more favourable for the customer when that company is 
relatively powerful. 
            
 1.3 Characteristics of VMI and CI agreements           
          Our research will focus on quantitative analyses of VMI and CI agreements in supply 
chain settings. To understand the nature of those agreements, we provide in this section a 
further discussion based on our industry observations.     
         When there is a CI agreement, the customer sends purchase orders to the vendor for a 
specific time period. After the goods are delivered to a depot at his premises, he then takes 
the required amount at any time from the vendor’s stock (i.e., the customer does not pay for 
goods until they are used). Therefore, CI is regarded as more beneficial for the customer: a) 
CI requires no information sharing; b) inventory management takes a minimum effort for the 
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customer, who pays no opportunity cost of capital in inventory;  c) the customer can order as 
much as storage space permits, yet pays just upon use. The only benefit foreseen for the 
vendor is continued business with the customer.  
          If there is a VMI agreement, however, the vendor is not controlled by the customer. 
The vendor can simultaneously manage the total inventory (its own and the customer’s), and 
produce more effectively because of increased flexibility in timing and quantity. She thus can 
use economies of scale in her operations.  
           Under a VMI agreement, inventory and warehousing costs for the items supplied are 
generally charged to the customer. However, in some cases, a strong customer may force the 
vendor to assume those costs as well. The latter agreement could be termed “consignment 
and vendor managed inventory (C&VMI)”, where the vendor owns as well as controls the 
inventory of the customer.  
            The general opinion in industry seems to be that VMI (but without CI) is more 
favourable for the vendor, who would consolidate orders and ship larger amounts without 
worrying about the average inventory level of customers. Table 1.1 summarizes qualitatively 
some characteristics found in industrial VMI and CI agreements. 
          Naturally, this thesis is concerned with academic issues in VMI. We will adopt the 
point of view throughout that consignment stock should be considered distinctly from VMI 
(although the contract may include both).  Dong and Xu (2002), who study the economics of 
consignment inventory in the long-term and short-term, and others, however, have taken 
VMI to be synonymous with the consignment arrangement. There is thus not unanimous 
agreement about our interpretation. The following section will amplify the types of models 
we will analyze. 
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Aspect VMI CI 
Inventory  Inventory is owned by the 
vendor or by the customer 
 Inventory is owned by the 
vendor  
Warehouse Warehouse is owned by the 
vendor or by the customer 
 Warehouse is owned by the 
customer 
Ordering Performed by the vendor Performed by the  customer  
Power Relations  Vendor and customer have 
almost equal power 
Customer is more powerful 
Industry More common in retail 
sector where goods are “end 
products” 
Common both in retail and 
manufacturing sectors 
Role in Supply Chain Vendor may be a raw 
material supplier, a semi-
finished goods 
manufacturer, end-products 
manufacturer or distributor 
Same as VMI, but no 
distributor 
 
           Table 1.1: Attributes of VMI and CI agreements observed in industry   
  
1.4 Problem Definition and Research Scope 
           In this thesis, we study VMI, CI, and C&VMI agreements in three independent essays, 
each written in a “paper” form.  First two essays assume stationary demand, and consider 
various agreements in a supply chain composed of a single vendor and customer. The last 
essay is concerned with VMI and C&VMI agreements in a supply chain of a single vendor 
and multiple customers facing time-varying, but deterministic demand. We shall now 
describe the problems and research goals in those essays separately. 
 
1.4.1 Calculating the Benefits of Vendor Managed Inventory in a   
                             Manufacturer-Retailer System 
          The models in this essay will concern one vendor (manufacturer or supplier) who 
produces a single product at a sole manufacturing plant and furnishes it to a particular 
customer (buyer or retailer). A conceptual framework of the problem is depicted in Fig. 1.4.  
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        Figure 1.4: Vendor-customer inventory system 
 
            The customer faces a constant demand which is known. When the parties act 
independently, the customer decides its replenishment orders. Suppose there is no lead time 
and all customer orders are known instantaneously by the vendor. At any moment of time, 
the vendor’s plant is either idle (actually, producing other SKUs not part of this analysis), or 
manufacturing the given item at a constant production rate which is larger than the 
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customer is replenished, those units are shipped from the vendor’s inventory to the 
customer’s.  
           Because of constant prices, the vendor’s total production cost and the customer’s 
overall revenue are both linear, and will be omitted since all demands have to be satisfied. 
We assume that the vendor’s fixed costs of setup and of shipment dispatch, and the 
customer’s fixed cost per order are independent of the quantities involved. Both parties’ 
inventory costs are directly proportional to the average stock levels. 
          The performance criterion we use in our models is the same as in EOQ models, namely 
the total cost of inventory holding plus ordering (including shipment dispatch). We begin 
with the simplest situation where the vendor and customer make independent decisions. This 
forms the base case. We then develop and analyze a VMI agreement and compare it to the 
preceding, so as to obtain insights into the potential benefits of vendor managed inventory. 
We also develop a model for central decision making where all parties belong to the same 
firm, and compare it to the base case and VMI. 
          Determination of the optimal order quantity and number of orders, where each party 
minimizes his own cost, is the well known EOQ approach for the customer and modified 
Economic Production Quantity (EPQ) for the manufacturer. Taking this as the base case and 
carefully identifying the cost parameters of each party, our aim is to develop and analyze 
quantitative cost models through which the economic value of VMI can be estimated. In light 
of those analyses, we will provide insights from the point of view of the vendor, the customer 
and the whole system.  Inventory control policies of the following cases will be investigated 
in Essay 3: 
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1. No agreement between the parties. Vendor and customer act separately as in 
traditional systems. Hence, each party is responsible for its own inventory control. 
The customer decides the quantity and timing of replenishments. The vendor 
produces any quantity demanded in an optimal way. 
2. Vendor Managed Inventory. The vendor and customer act based on a VMI agreement 
where each party is responsible for its own inventory holding costs, but the vendor 
establishes and manages the inventory control policy of the customer. The vendor 
therefore pays an ordering cost on behalf of the customer. 
3. Central Decision Making. The analysis is similar to Joint Economic Lot Sizing. 
System-wide cost, which is merely the sum of all costs associated with each party, is 
minimized. As a result, the customer’s optimal order quantity is found, and the 
vendor’s optimal batch production quantity is an integer multiple of it. 
 
1.4.2 Impact of Consignment Inventory and Vendor Managed Inventory 
                        for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain 
          The problem setting and description in this essay are the same as in Essay 1, but now 
we analyze CI and C&VMI agreements. Those agreements will be compared within 
themselves, and also to the traditional way of doing business (base case). In Essays 2 and 3, 
we shall refer to the base case as “Inventory Sourcing” (IS).   
          Under CI, since goods belong to the vendor until used by the customer, the vendor 
pays the inventory-holding expense of goods stored at the customer’s site. However, it is still 
the customer who makes replenishment orders. Expenses for physical storage of stock are 
still borne by the customer; the vendor is responsible only for the opportunity-cost of capital, 
which may not be the same with that of customer.   
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         C&VMI refers to VMI coupled with CI. Therefore, it is now the vendor who makes 
orders on behalf of the customer, but still owns the goods until at the customer’s location 
until they are used. Our aim is to identify the conditions under which IS, CI, or C&VMI are 
preferred sourcing options for the vendor and customer. The three cases we look at are 
summarized below.  
1. Inventory Sourcing (IS). This is exactly the same with the base case in Essay 1. There 
is no agreement between parties. 
2. Consignment Inventory (CI). The vendor and customer act based on a consignment 
agreement, where the quantity and timing of customer’s replenishment are decided by 
the customer itself. (The customer thus pays its own ordering cost.) Any inventory 
supplied by the vendor is owned by her until used. The customer pays the physical 
storage cost of those goods, whereas the vendor incurs opportunity cost of capital.  
3. VMI and CI together (C&VMI). The vendor and customer act based on a consignment 
agreement (the vendor still pays the inventory holding costs of the customer), where 
now the vendor decides the timing and quantity of customer replenishments. 
 
1.4.3 Analysis of VMI for a Single Vendor and Multiple Customers under  
                       Deterministic, Time-Varying Demands         
           The previous papers evaluate various agreements between a vendor and customer to 
understand under what conditions an agreement can create benefits. Those benefits to the 
vendor, customer and the entire system depend on the cost parameters of the parties involved. 
However, VMI can be more advantageous to achieve economies of scale in production and 
transportation when multiple customers are involved. In Essay 3, we therefore study VMI 
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agreements for a vendor and multiple customers in a supply chain where the vendor can 
make better use of her replenishment authority. 
           It is customary in industry to exercise time periods for the realization of operational 
decisions.  In many real life situations, demands are satisfied at the beginning or end of 
certain time periods such as days, weeks or months. Accordingly, purchasing materials and 
finished goods, releasing and receiving shipments, scheduling production and storage are 
based on those time periods. We employ this idea in Essay 3, and use a time horizon 
composed of 12 periods. Demand in each period varies, but it is deterministic. 





Figure 1.5: Single vendor, multi-customer supply chain (Distribution System) 
 
            The supply chain we consider in Essay 3 includes a single vendor who produces a 
unique item for her multiple customers (Figure 1.5). End-consumer demand, which is 
different for each customer, is realized only at the customers. Customers are independent; 
each must meet the demand of his end-consumers, and the vendor must meet the 
replenishment orders issued by customers. No backlogging is allowed. 
           In the traditional way of doing business (IS), each customer orders from the vendor 
based on his costs of inventory holding and ordering. That ordering cost includes the costs of 












of a period and received immediately (i.e., lead time is assumed zero). Inventory holding 
costs are incurred for stocks on hand at the end of any period.  
          Under IS, the vendor has to fulfill the orders specified by her customers. We assume 
that the vendor’s production capacity exceeds total demand in any period. Customer orders 
are shipped at the beginning of periods, and inventory holding cost is charged at the end of 
each period for the items on hand. Production-lead time is assumed to be zero. Production 
and sale costs are linear with constants prices, and can be neglected since all demands must 
be met. In addition to the inventory holding cost, the vendor pays a production setup cost 
each time she initiates manufacturing; incurs a cost per shipment released to one or more 
customers; and transportation costs. 
           To evaluate the impacts of VMI on shipment consolidation, we assume that the 
transportation cost is paid by the vendor. (That is, a vendor in control of the timing and 
quantity of shipments can combine the small orders of different customers to achieve 
economies of scale in transportation, if the transportation cost is paid by her).  We further 
assume that the vendor engages the transportation services of a common carrier, i.e. a public, 
for-hire trucking company.  
           That carrier, taking into account an all-units discount scheme, offers a piece-wise 
linear freight rate as a function of the total weight in a given shipment. At the end of a period, 
a vehicle dispatched from the vendor may carry an amount b of goods to be dropped to a total 
of i customers. The carrier then charges the vendor a fixed cost for every stop the truck 
makes. We do not consider shipment routing in this paper. 
           Under IS, each customer has his own ordering plan, and replenishes separately from 
the vendor. That plan depends on inventory holding charges and ordering costs. Once all 
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customers determine their replenishment policies over the planning horizon, the vendor 
collects them to plan her production. The vendor is aware of the customers’ ordering plans, 
but not the actual end-consumer demand. 
          When the customers make decisions regarding the timing and quantity of 
replenishments, it is difficult for the vendor (who must meet the customers’ requirements) to 
seek economies of scale in her operations. The vendor may prefer alternative replenishment 
quantities and/or different ordering times than the customers specify. That is, their decisions 
may act as constraints against the vendor’s  flexibility which she requires to decrease her 
production, inventory and transportation costs.    
           A VMI agreement between a vendor and customer gives her that flexibility, but at a 
cost. Under VMI, the vendor makes replenishment decisions on behalf of the customer, and 
pays the cost of replenishment decision-making. The agreement also provides the vendor 
with data on the end-consumer demand.  
           When there are n 2≥  customers, the vendor may choose to implement VMI with 
fewer than n. By a “VMI-customer”, we shall mean one who implements VMI with the 
vendor. VMI-customers are relieved of paying expenses associated with making 
replenishments. Although this may not guarantee them lower costs compared to IS, no 
customer would implement VMI unless he is no worse off. Under VMI, the vendor may wish 
to send large quantities to achieve economies of scale in transportation. Then, should the 
customer accept any quantity determined by the vendor, or should he set some limits to it? A 
customer that is offered VMI must answer this question, before accepting the agreement, so 
his costs do not go up.  
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           The vendor, on the other hand, is concerned first with the right set of customers to 
offer VMI. Before implementing the agreement, the vendor must foresee the savings it can 
create in production, replenishment and transportation. The vendor, too, would not wish to 
undertake any VMI agreements that create no cost savings. 
           When Consignment Inventory is coupled with Vendor Managed Inventory (C&VMI), 
the vendor now owns the stock at a C&VMI-customer’s premises until the items are used. 
Hence, the vendor pays the opportunity cost of those goods. In this case, even when there is 
no restriction specified by the customer, it may be in the vendor’s best interest not to send 
large quantities. As in VMI, both the vendor and customer would want to get the best from 
this agreement. Therefore, either party will cast aside implementing C&VMI if the agreement 
increases their total costs compared to IS.   
           Similar to the first two essays, IS will be the base case to which we compare VMI and 
C&VMI. Although the outcomes of these two agreements will be contrasted, choosing to 
implement any agreement is based on comparison of total costs under that agreement vs IS. 
Values of decision variables and total costs of the vendor and customers in each case will be 
determined using Mixed Integer Programming.  Each of the following sourcing option will 
be modeled and solved in separate sections.    
1. Inventory Sourcing (IS): Each customer decides on replenishments first based on his 
minimum total costs. A customer’s cost stems from replenishment decision-making, 
shipment-received, physical storage and opportunity cost of inventory. The vendor 
receives the order quantities from each customer, and optimizes her operations based 
on her costs of production setup, inventory holding and transportation. Under IS, the 
customers’ optimal replenishment decisions are input to the vendor’s model. 
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2. Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI): The vendor now makes replenishment orders on 
behalf of customers. Hence, there is only one model that determines the production, 
customer-replenishment, and transportation quantities and timing. The vendor pays a 
cost for each decision made to replenish, which is assumed to be the same as what the 
customer pays in IS. The vendor’s problem is solved by a heuristic which 1. separates 
VMI decisions (concern the right set of customers with whom to implement VMI) 
from the model, and 2. solves hierarchically the remaining problem of integrated 
production, replenishment and transportation by three different decomposition 
methods. We also determine whether a customer should set a maximum-inventory 
level that the vendor can keep at his premises.  
3. Consignment and Vendor Managed Inventory (C&VMI): The vendor determines each 
customer’s replenishment quantity as in VMI, but now pays, in addition to the cost of 
replenishment decision making, the opportunity cost of goods stored at the customers’ 
locations. Hence, there is still one model to find optimal production, replenishment 
and transportation quantities, and timing. Of course, the vendor should also identify 
the best set of C&VMI-customers. The vendor’s model is solved using Lagrangian 
relaxation. The Lagrange multipliers are determined using the cutting-plane approach 
of Kelly (1960). 
           
          In all the models of Essay 3, we assume that at time zero and at the end of the planning 
horizon, there is no inventory anywhere in the supply chain. Moreover, end-consumer 
demand of a customer is revealed to the vendor when VMI becomes an option for those two 
parties. Our aim is to evaluate the cost impacts of the agreement for the vendor before 
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implementing it. We will also show the maximum level of inventory that should be allowed 
by the customer under VMI.  
            The three essays described in this section form the main chapters of our thesis. Each 
of them is written in a paper form and incorporated into to thesis body as it is. Therefore, 
format of this thesis differs from the usual. We explain that format more in detail in the next 
section.   
 
1.5 Thesis Outline  
          The previous sections of Chapter 1 provided an overview of the topics and models we 
will cover. Since we included the major chapters of this thesis in the essay format, we shall 
now provide a brief outline of them, as well the rest of the chapters involved.   
         Each of chapters three to five are written as independent essays. Therefore, each has its 
own abstract, introduction, literature review, analysis, conclusions and reference list.  As 
such, equations and analysis employed in one essay do not necessarily build up on a previous 
one. Corresponding numbers of those equations, as well as the proposition and lemma 
numbers, start from one in every essay. Table and figure numbers, on the other hand, follow 
a chapter-specific sequence, which is also reflected in the Table of Contents.  
         Appendices that provide various proofs are also included within essays. Appendix A at 
the end of Essay 1 (Chapter 3) details the proofs of four propositions stated in that essay. 
Similarly, Appendix B at the end of Chapter 4 explains the proof of a proposition specific to 
Essay 2. There is no appendix to Essay 3, which is Chapter 5. 
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         Chapter 6 is the last chapter of the thesis, and summarizes our conclusions derived from 
the analysis provided in three essays. Possible future-research streams are also included 
there.          
           Chapter 2, which will be discussed next, provides a general survey of the literature 
related to VMI agreements we consider. The reference list at the back of this thesis document 
corresponds to that general survey. Naturally, the literature review provided in each essay 
may include some of the papers introduced in Chapter 2. However, each of those essays will 
also study additional papers specific to the topic of that essay and to the modeling approach 
considered in it (e.g., Dynamic Lot Sizing in Essay 3). Comparison of our work with the 
previous studies is also described more in detail in those essays.  
            










2. Literature Review 
 
           The literature survey provided in this chapter relates to VMI agreements in general, 
and serves as a seed for our essays. We do not necessarily detail our contributions here.  
          We have identified three categories of literature that have ties to VMI research. The 
first concerns the joint economic lot sizing problem. Though not apparently related to VMI, it 
forms the starting point of our analysis, and can be considered a form of coordinated decision 
making. The second category depicts a VMI agreement as a mechanism to coordinate the 
supply chain, while the third identifies literature that is more focused on operational benefits 
of VMI contracts.  
 
2.1 Joint Economic Lot-Sizing (JELS) Models 
            Also called integrated vendor-buyer models, research in this category minimizes the 
overall cost of a two echelon inventory system composed of a single supplier and one or 
multiple customers. Based on deterministic EOQ models, the cost function of the parties at 
each echelon is the sum of inventory holding and ordering costs. Instead of separately 
optimizing each actor’s cost, studies in this area minimize a total-cost function, adding up the 
cost of each party. 
              Banarjee (1986) was the first to analyze an integrated vendor-buyer model where the 
vendor produced items at a finite rate. He examined a lot-for-lot model in which the vendor 
manufactures each shipment as a separate batch. As an extension, Goyal (1988) formulated a 
joint total-relevant-cost model for a single vendor and buyer production-inventory system, 
where the vendor’s lot size is an integer multiple of the buyer’s order size. He still assumed 
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that the vendor can ship to the purchaser only after the entire lot is completed. A batch that 
constitutes an integral number of equal shipments furnished a lower-cost solution. A 
summary of research to that date on integrated vendor-buyer models can be found in Goyal 
and Gupta (1989).   
               Lu (1995) extends Goyal’s (1988) work by allowing the vendor to supply some 
quantity to the purchaser before completing the entire lot. Lu gives an optimal solution for 
the case of a single vendor and buyer, again based on the assumption that a batch provides an 
integral number of equal-sized shipments. She also investigates heuristics for the single-
vendor, multiple-buyer problem. 
             Goyal (1995) employed the example provided by Lu for the single vendor and buyer, 
but showed that a different shipment policy, other than equal-size, could give a better 
solution. The policy assumed that each successive shipment within a production batch 
increases by a factor (ratio of production rate to demand rate). This was also based on Goyal 
(1977) who solved a very similar problem in a slightly different setting.  
             Hill (1997, 1998) considered a single vendor who manufactures a product at a finite 
rate and in batches, and supplies a sole buyer whose external demand is level and fixed. Each 
batch is sent to the buyer in a number of shipments. The vendor incurs a batch setup cost and 
a fixed order or delivery cost associated with each shipment. The four parameters in his 
model are thus inventory holding for the vendor and for the buyer, a fixed production set up 
cost, and fixed cost per delivery. The study’s goal is to show, in general, that neither Lu’s 
(1995) nor Goyal’s (1995) shipment policies are optimal. Hill’s policy assumes that 
successive shipment sizes increase by a factor whose value lies between one and the ratio of 
manufacturing rate to the product’s demand rate. Considering the system as an integrated 
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whole, the objective is minimization of the total costs of all parties. Hill (1997) concludes 
that Goyal’s (1995) policy may perform much better than Lu’s equal-size-shipment policy, 
but his policy outperforms all. Later, Goyal (2000) proposed a procedure to modify the 
shipment size in Hill (1997) to obtain a still-lower cost. 
            Viswanathan (1998) considers a model to minimize the sum of overall costs of 
production setup, customer ordering, and vendor’s and buyer’s inventory carrying. He shows 
that the performance of Lu’s (1995) and Goyal’s (1995)  policies depend on the problem 
parameters. 
             Similar joint economic-lot-sizing problems, with small variations in structure and 
parameters used, are also investigated in two working papers. For a single vendor and 
customer, Ongsakul (1998) studies a joint lot-sizing model that also includes pipeline-
inventory cost. Kosadat (2000), in a similar vein, considers the impacts of backordering.  
             In general, the more-recent research on JELS showed numerically that a lower total 
cost could be achieved compared to earlier work. The joint cost function used in each study 
is simply the sum of the vendor’s production-setup and shipment-dispatch or ordering costs, 
and the inventory holding cost of each actor. However, real case examples show that vendors 
and customers are rarely willing to divulge their cost-related information in full. Except in 
the case of merger or acquisition, the vendor would generally be unable to learn the 
customer’s inventory holding and ordering costs. Hence, it is very unusual that one party 
alone could find system-wide optimality.  
           Moreover, the focus of JELS studies is more on numerical solution and overall cost 
comparison of integrated and separate systems. Little has been done on questions concerning 
 24 
the best type of relationship between two parties. Note also that any type of agreement would 
require the shift of some cost parameters from one actor to another.  
           None of the papers reviewed in this section notes that there are actually three types of 
setup costs, one for customer’s ordering and two for the vendor’s production-setup and 
shipment dispatch. All three are included explicitly in our models, whether it is joint 
decision-making or not (see Essay 1).  
                   
2.2 Supply Chain Coordination through VMI 
            Traditionally, the independent companies in a supply chain have not chosen policies 
that optimize overall supply-chain performance. Each firm has instead attempted to optimize 
its own objective. Coordination within a supply chain then mainly refers to finding the 
optimal actions for chain members who need to align their decisions to achieve optimal chain 
costs. The incentive to apply those optimal actions can be set by transfer payments. More on 
coordination can be found in Thomas and Griffin (1996), Corbett and Tang (1999), Boyaci 
and Callego (2000), Aviv (2001), Agrawal and Seshadri (2001), and Chen et al. (2001). We 
shall then summarize here a variety of research related to supply chain coordination. 
            Coordination is facilitated when entities in the supply chain will abide by a set of 
incentives that specify their activities; system-wide optimality may then be achieved 
(Cachon, 1998).  There are several examples of policies used to avoid deviations from 
system-wide optimal conditions. Buy-back contracts specify a price at which the supplier 
will purchase unsold items from the retailer (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999). Quantity discount is 
the price discount from the supplier whenever the retailer orders a greater amount of product 
(Weng 1995; Klastorin et al., 2002). Revenue sharing first maximizes the total profit of the 
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system and then finds the best allocation (Gerchak and Wang, 2002). A review of incentive 
methods for coordination is provided by Cho (2002).      
            One example of coordination through price discounts is presented by Viswanathan 
and Piplani (2001). In a single vendor and multi-buyer setting where the demand is 
deterministic, they consider the case where the vendor specifies common replenishment 
periods. Each buyer must replenish at (only) those times. The authors use a joint lot-sizing 
model, employing also a Stackelberg game: The vendor makes a first decision, and the 
customer then acts on this to make its own decision.   
             In other research that will be mentioned shortly, VMI agreements are conceived to be 
means of obtaining supply-chain coordination. Those authors usually consider a single 
vendor and one or multiple customers who experience stochastic demand. The objective 
function may be cost minimization or profit maximization, based on parameters of inventory 
holding, setup, shortage-penalty costs and selling price.  
             Note that although the academic interest in VMI agreements has developed only 
recently, the roots of such research go back to multi-echelon inventory papers starting with 
Clark and Scarf (1960). Assuming the entire system (consisting of a single vendor and 
customer) is controlled by a single person, they developed an optimal policy for a finite 
planning horizon. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) then extended and simplified that policy for 
the case of infinite horizon.  More information on development of this type of multi-echelon 
inventory control can be found in Lee and Whang (1999) and in Dong and Lee (2001).  
               Cachon (2001) studies VMI in a single supplier and multi-retailer setting. Several 
different strategies are analyzed with the aim of coordinating the channel. In each case, he 
employs game theory to find the equilibrium for each party of the supply chain. With a VMI 
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agreement, the supplier can set all reorder points. Cachon remarks that VMI alone does not 
guarantee an optimal supply-chain solution; both the vendor and retailers must also agree to 
make fixed transfer payments to participate in the VMI contract, and then be willing to share 
the benefits. He employs a numerical study to show that no improvement under VMI can be 
achieved if fixed payments are not allowed.  
              Aviv and Federgruen (1998), with the aim of investigating impacts of information 
sharing, consider a single vendor plus multiple retailers. They assume a VMI agreement that 
leads to a fully centralized planning model where the vendor minimizes the system-wide total 
cost of inventory holding and distribution. Using a combination of Markov decision process 
and non-linear programming, they construct approximate policies for the vendor and the 
retailers under both information-sharing alone and information sharing in conjunction with 
VMI. They find that VMI (with that sharing) is always more beneficial than information 
sharing alone.  
               Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) study a constant-demand-rate VMI setting 
characterized as a partially centralized model (the retailer retains decision rights on pricing 
and sales target). The supplier determines a replenishment strategy for the entire supply 
chain. They show that channel coordination can be achieved under VMI. In their model, the 
vendor incurs all inventory holding costs including those at the retailer. Hence, the agreement 
they consider should be regarded as VMI and CI together, rather than a pure VMI.  
               Narayanan and Raman (1997) analyze VMI agreements between a single vendor 
and retailer. They compare traditional retailer-managed-inventory to VMI, identifying 
situations where stocking-decision rights should be transferred from retailer to vendor. 
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Narayanan and Raman investigate how an inability to observe and include certain variables 
(such as sales effort) in an agreement can affect supply-chain performance.  
          Corbett (2001) studies the impact of (cost) information asymmetries between 
supplier and customer, where there are also incentive conflicts between them.  In a principal-
agent framework, he shows how consignment inventory can help reduce cycle stock, but may 
simultaneously increase the safety stock.  (We note in passing that the usual discussions of 
“information sharing” do not extend to knowledge of the cost parameters.) 
                 Aside from papers reviewed previously in this section, Gavirneni et al. (1996), 
Cachon and Fisher (2000), and Lee et al. (2000) look at how a supplier can use  customer-
demand information for better sales forecasting and inventory control. These models show 
significant direct and indirect benefits to the supplier. (Indirect benefit refers to the 
possibility that the supplier will pass some of its own benefits to the retailers.) However, 
retailers receive no direct benefit.    
 
2.3 VMI for Operational Benefits  
         Research in this category focuses on benefits offered by flexibility in delivery and 
other operational decisions under VMI agreements. That flexibility may enable a supplier to 
combine routes from multiple origins and delay stock assignments, consolidate shipments to 
two or more customers, or postpone a decision on the quantity destined for each of them. 
              Campbell et al. (1998) and Kleywegt et al. (2000) analyze a stochastic inventory-
routing problem by a Markov decision process. Both investigate the benefits of allowing the 
supplier to construct better delivery routes for multiple retailers.   
               Cheung and Lee (2002) consider a single supplier serving multiple retailers who 
face random demand. The supplier (replenished by an outside source with ample stock) 
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follows a continuous review (Q,r) policy; lead time is constant and unfilled demand is 
backordered. The authors analyze two information-based supply-chain efforts:  
1. Knowledge of retailers’ inventory position to coordinate and achieve truck load shipments 
2. Use of that same information to balance retailers’ stocking positions.  
             The research of Cheung and Lee focuses on benefits in terms of shipment 
coordination and stock rebalancing. This is done through upper and lower bounds, and by 
simulating the costs of the joint replenishment model.   
              In a similar study, Cetinkaya and Lee (2000) synchronize inventory and 
transportation decisions. For the case of Poisson demand observed at retailers, an analytical 
model based on renewal theory enables determination of the optimal replenishment quantity 
and dispatch frequency. Their contribution is based on an idealized application of VMI, 
whereby the vendor has the autonomy of holding orders until a suitable dispatch time at 
which orders can be economically consolidated.  
             Aviv and Federgruen (1998) quantify the benefits of inventory sharing and VMI 
programs in a periodic review setting. VMI allows the supplier to determine the optimal 
timing and quantity of replenishments. As opposed to Cheung and Lee (2002), their 
formulation does not include shipment constraints.  
           Chaouch (2001) analyzes a single powerful retailer and a supplier who wants quicker 
replenishment at lower costs ( see also Fisher 1997 for the shift in power towards the 
retailer). His study can be regarded as a transportation-inventory problem whose tradeoffs are 
investment in inventory, delivery rates and shortages. The supplier’s performance measures 
are the frequency of shipment dispatch and the frequency of retailer stockouts. Time between 
deliveries is a stochastic variable; the retailer’s demand is fairly stable but with Poisson-
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distributed jumps. Under a VMI agreement, the supplier is fully responsible for shortage and 
delivery costs and can choose the delivery interval. The supplier is allowed to stock at most 
M units at the retailer, who must bear the inventory carrying cost. The author’s cost 
minimization models find the shipment rate that balances delivery and shortage costs.  
             Fry et al. (2000) also examine VMI as a means of offering a single supplier and 
retailer some operational flexibility. The supplier follows a fixed production schedule, but 
can ship to the retailer in each or any period. They assume that VMI is initiated by a contract 
which transfers decision rights to the supplier, but that supplier must maintain certain stock 
levels at the retailer. Performance of traditional retailer-managed-inventory  with information 
sharing and VMI are compared.  Through a periodic review inventory model, they show that 
VMI is beneficial in most scenarios but not all, and that its effectiveness depends strongly on 
the initiating contract.  
             Waller et al. (1999) follow a simulation-study approach to analyze the impacts of 
VMI under various levels of demand variability, limited manufacturing capacity,  and partial 
channel coordination. They demonstrate that inventory-reduction achieved in VMI is due to 
more frequent reviews of stock and shorter intervals between deliveries. Associated costs are 
not discussed.  
       Chapter 2 has thus summarized the several important streams of literature with ties to 






3. Calculating the Benefits of Vendor Managed Inventory in a 




        Firms such as Wal-Mart and Campbell’s Soup have successfully implemented Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI). Articles in the trade press and in academic literature often begin 
with the premise that VMI is “beneficial.” But beneficial to which party? Under what 
conditions? 
    We consider in this paper a vendor V that manufactures a particular product at a unique 
location. That item is sold to a single retailer, the customer C. Three cases are treated in 
detail: Independent decision making (no agreement between the parties); VMI, whereby the 
supplier V initiates orders on behalf of C; and Central decision making (both Vendor and 
Customer are controlled by the same corporate entity). 
    Values of some cost parameters may vary between the three cases, and each case may 
cause a different actor to be responsible for particular expenses. Under a constant demand 
rate, optimal solutions are obtained analytically for the customer’s order quantity, the 
vendor’s production quantity, hence the parties’ individual and total costs in the three cases. 
Inequalities are obtained to delineate those situations in which VMI is beneficial.     
 
3.1 Introduction 
    A supply chain implies interactions of different firms that seek decreased costs and 
greater market share. However, when the companies are managed independently, decisions 
made by individual firms downstream in the chain can impose constraints on those upstream, 
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resulting in additional costs. Consider the simplest example of a supply chain where there is a 
manufacturer (called the vendor, V) who supplies materials or products, and a customer C 
that orders from V (Figure 3.1). When each party makes decisions independently, the 
customer determines a replenishment based on minimizing his own operational costs.  
However, since the customer’s decisions on timing and quantity neglect the vendor’s costs, 
the resulting quantities might not be preferred by the vendor.  
    On the other hand, coordinated decision making (Figure 3.2) fosters potential benefits 
for the individual organizations. It may reduce the need for inventories and lower the 





Figure 3.1: Independent decision making 
 
 
   
 
Figure 3.2: Coordinated decision making 
 
    Two forms of coordination identified in the literature are vertical and virtual 
integration. In the former, one supply chain member acquires the others or various members 
merge. However, that ends the independence of the firms, and can fail (Aviv and Federgruen 












    The second form of co-ordination, virtual integration, maintains the independence of 
those firms, yet harmonizes their decisions by means of a business arrangement between 
them. Chapters included in Tayur et al. (1999) discuss a number of such approaches. Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI), the subject of the present paper, is one example. 
    VMI, also referred to as a program of supplier-managed inventory or direct 
replenishment, emerged in the late 1980’s as a partnership to coordinate replenishment 
decisions in a supply chain while maintaining the independence of chain members. In this 
relationship between a vendor and customer, it is the vendor that decides when and in what 
quantity the customer’s stock is replenished. VMI was successfully implemented by 
numerous firms including Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble (Waller et al. 1999), Campbell 
Soup Company (Clark 1994), Barilla SpA (Hammond 1994), Intel (Kanellos 1998) and Shell 
Chemical (Hibbard 1998).  
    Despite the range of such examples of VMI relationships, there are researchers who 
question whether VMI is beneficial to all parties. For example, Burke (1996) claims that 
vendors are unwillingly forced into a VMI agreement by powerful customers. Saccomano 
(1997) argues that VMI is just a way to transfer the risks involved in inventory management 
from customers to vendors. Betts (1994) mentions that the vendor may be overwhelmed since, 
to make VMI work, more technological investment is required there than at the customer.  
According to Copacino (1993), a poorly designed VMI agreement can harm the supplier who 
ships more often to satisfy the inventory turns required at the retailer.   
    Disputes over the benefits of VMI arise because few quantitative analyses are 
available, and in those, general attributes of the agreements are fully understood in only some 
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instances. That makes it difficult to assess and justify even conceptual models of VMI 
contracts.  
    Our aim in this paper is thus to develop and compare replenishment models by 
considering carefully the costs incurred by the vendor and the customer in various settings. 
We start with the traditional uncoordinated scenario where the customer makes the ordering 
decisions and the vendor reacts (Case 1).  
    Without a VMI agreement, the customer is responsible for inventory holding cost, 
transportation expense, and ordering charges: the cost of issuing the order and the cost of 
receiving those goods. “Issuing the order” relates to writing up the purchase request and 
determining the size of order, and thus, it is the cost of having the authority over 
replenishment planning. The vendor’s expenses are those of production setup, inventory 
holding and shipment release.  
    We next assume that the vendor is not content in simply reacting, and wants to get 
involved in replenishment decision-making. With VMI (Case 2), the vendor takes over the 
ordering decision and hence the issuing-cost related to it, which might not be the same as 
what the customer used to pay. We analyze under what circumstances VMI is beneficial for 
one of the parties, or for both of them.  
    Ignoring any organizational difficulty or investment implication, we finally consider 
central decision making (Case 3). We will also term this, “vertical integration,” where both 
parties are assumed to belong to the same company. Cost differences between vertical 
integration and VMI, and between vertical integration and independent decision making, are 
then explored.   
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      There are publications that investigate how a certain type of VMI agreement impacts 
supply chain coordination. Examples include Aviv and Federgruen (1998), who analyze VMI 
in terms of information sharing, and find that VMI with information sharing is always more 
beneficial than information sharing alone. Cachon (2001) suggests fixed transfer payments in 
addition to VMI in a single supplier and multi-retailer setting. Bernstein and Federgruen 
(2003) study a partially centralized VMI model and conclude that channel coordination can 
be achieved under VMI.  
    Our research, on the other hand, analyzes tradeoffs between independent versus 
coordinated decision making. In a broader context, we try to understand what VMI is, and 
under what circumstances it works or fails.   
    VMI has also been conceived as a means of enabling operational benefits. Through the 
“flexibility” that VMI offers, the supplier may combine routes from multiple origins 
(Campbell et al. 1998, Kleywegt et al. 2002) and delay stock assignments, consolidate 
shipments to two or more customers (Cheung and Lee 2002), or postpone a decision on the 
quantity destined for each of them (Cetinkaya and Lee 2000). VMI may also come up in a 
transportation-inventory problem whose tradeoffs are investment in inventory, delivery rates 
and shortages (Chaouch 2001), or in a simulation-study that analyzes the impacts of demand 
variability, limited manufacturing capacity, and partial channel coordination (Waller et al. 
1999).  
    The preceding stream of literature, “VMI for operational benefits,” investigates the 
gains when decisions are supported by a presumed contract. However, we are aware of no 
publication on VMI which considers the cost implications of changing the decision-making 
authority from one party to another.   
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    The Joint Economic Lot-Sizing (JELS) problem, although not apparently related to 
VMI, forms the starting point of our analysis, and can be considered a form of coordinated 
decision making. Also called “integrated vendor-buyer models,” research in this category 
minimizes the overall cost of a two-echelon inventory system composed of a single supplier 
and one or multiple customers. The cost function of the parties at each echelon is the sum of 
inventory holding and ordering costs. Instead of separately optimizing each party’s cost, 
studies in this area minimize a total-cost function, adding up the cost to each of them. 
    Banarjee (1986) was first to analyze the integrated vendor-buyer case, examining a lot-
for-lot model in which V manufactures each shipment as a separate batch. As an extension, 
Goyal (1988) formulated a joint total-relevant-cost model for a single vendor and customer 
production-inventory system, where V’s lot size is an integer multiple of C’s order size. 
    Lu (1995) extended Goyal’s (1988) work by allowing the vendor to supply some 
quantity to the purchaser before completing the entire lot. Lu gives an optimal solution for 
the case of a single vendor and buyer, and investigates heuristics for the single-vendor, 
multiple-buyer problem. Goyal (1995) employed the example provided by Lu for the single 
vendor and buyer, but showed that a different shipment policy could give a better solution. 
    Hill (1997, 1998) considers a single vendor who manufactures a product at a finite rate 
and in batches, and supplies a sole buyer whose external demand is level and fixed. Each 
batch is sent to the buyer in a number of shipments. The vendor incurs a batch setup cost and 
a fixed order or delivery cost associated with each shipment. Hill’s policy assumes that 
successive shipment sizes increase by a factor whose value lies between one and the ratio of 
manufacturing rate to the product’s demand rate. Hill (1997) concludes that, although 
Goyal’s (1995) policy may perform much better than Lu’s equal-size-shipment policy, his 
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own policy outperforms all. Goyal (2000) proposed a procedure to modify the shipment size 
in Hill (1997) to obtain a still-lower cost. 
     Studies on general coordination are not always conclusive. Suitable incentives for 
coordination may not have been discussed, and numerical examples in those papers show that 
cost reduction might not be that significant. Total cost of the coordinated system might have 
been underestimated, e.g. by ignoring the customer’s expense for ordering. That is often seen  
(e.g. Hill 1997), resulting in unrealistically lower costs. We also remark that changes to any 
system require adjustments in the relevant parameters.  
    Moreover, the sharing of cost-related information by two independent parties hardly 
occurs unless C and V belong to the same firm, making general-coordination difficult to 
achieve. A VMI contract, on the other hand, enables coordination based on cost reallocation, 
and leaving each party still independent. 
    Having thus summarized the several important streams of literature with ties to our 
research, the following sections will amplify the types of models we analyze. As opposed to 
Dong and Xu (2002), who study the economics of consignment inventory in the long-term 
and short-term, we will adopt the point of view throughout that consignment inventory (CI) 
should be treated distinctly from VMI. Under CI, the vendor still owns the products shipped, 
until the customer sells those items. Consignment inventory will be considered no further in 
what follows. 
 
3.2 Problem Definition and Research Scope  
    Our models will concern one vendor V who produces a single product at one 
manufacturing plant, and furnishes it to a particular customer (retailer). The customer C faces 
a constant, deterministic demand which is known. Suppose there is no lead time and all 
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customer orders are transmitted instantaneously to the vendor. At any moment of time, the 
vendor’s plant is either idle (actually, producing other SKUs not part of this analysis), or 
manufacturing the given item at a constant production rate which is larger than the 
customer’s demand rate. The vendor thus produces in batches at a finite rate. When the 
customer is replenished, those units are shipped from the vendor’s inventory to the 
customer’s.  
          Because of constant prices, the vendor’s total production cost and the customer’s 
overall revenue are both linear, and will be omitted since all demands have to be satisfied. 
We assume that the vendor’s fixed costs of setup and of shipment dispatch, and the 
customer’s fixed cost per order, are independent of the quantities involved. Both parties’ 
inventory costs are directly proportional to the average stock levels.  The performance 
criterion we use in our models is the total cost of inventory holding plus ordering. 
    Independent decision making (Case 1) is the traditional way of doing business between 
the vendor and the customer. Taking this as the base case and carefully identifying the cost 
parameters of each party, our aim is to develop and analyze quantitative cost models through 
which the economic value of VMI agreements can be estimated. In light of those calculations, 
we will provide insights on desirable agreements.  
Inventory control policies for the following cases will be investigated in this paper: 
1. No agreement between the parties. Vendor and customer act separately. Hence, each 
independent party is responsible for its own inventory control. The customer 
determines a replenishment quantity and passes it to the vendor.  The vendor then 
optimizes her production quantity in satisfying the customer’s order. But the actors 
are otherwise engaged in independent decision making. 
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2. VMI. The vendor and customer are governed by a VMI agreement: Each party is 
responsible for its own inventory holding costs, but the vendor establishes and 
manages the inventory control policy of the customer. VMI thus requires shifting 
some costs from the customer to the vendor. We will compare to the case with no 
agreement, to see if VMI is efficient (both parties realize costs savings), potentially 
efficient (system-wide cost savings are achieved although one party is worse off), or 
inefficient (no system-wide cost savings). 
3. Central decision making. The vendor and the customer belong to the same corporate 
entity who manages the inventory of both parties. The model considered is similar to 
JELS models, and our aim is to identify any potential benefits in this vertical 
integration compared to no-agreement (independent decision making) and VMI.  
   These cases will be analyzed in Sections 4-6, and then numerical examples and further 
interpretation will follow in Sections 7 and 8. In the final section, we provide a summary and 
conclusions.    
 
3.3 Notation  
    Let us begin with the basic notation that will be employed throughout our models. 
Ac: Customer’s fixed cost of ordering ($ per order).  Ac = ao + at + ar , where  
ao : cost of issuing the order 
at  : transportation cost  
ar : cost of receiving the goods ordered  
hc : Annual cost to carry one unit in stock at customer’s retail store ($/unit/year). This has two 
       parts in it, viz      h: cost of capital per item;   hs: physical storage cost of an item  
The customer’s inventory holding cost is thus hc  = h  + hs  
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S : Vendor’s fixed production setup cost incurred at the start of each cycle ($ per setup) 
av  : Vendor’s cost per shipment release ($ per shipment to the customer) 
hv : Annual cost of holding a unit in inventory at the vendor’s production site ($/unit/year)   
      
p : Vendor’s annual production rate (units/year)  
d : Annual demand rate at the customer (units/year).  
ki : Number of shipments to customer between successive production runs  
(i.e. during the vendor’s cycle time) in Case i, i = 1, 2, 3 
    For feasibility, it is assumed throughout that p ≥ d. But, as opposed to JELS models in 
general, we do not require  hc ≥   hv. Note that any type of agreement between the parties may 
require a shift in expenses from one actor to the other. But unless explicitly stated, it should 
not be assumed that a cost parameter of the vendor includes another one of the customer.       
    The cost of receiving the goods shipped is incurred by the customer, independent of 
which party initiates the replenishment order. That expense includes the costs related to the 
arrival of product at the store, receipt of the vendor’s invoice and further processing (by the 
customer) of that invoice. Likewise, the vendor pays the costs related to receipt of the order 
information and the processing of it, and is charged for release of goods to the customer.  
    Let us begin in the next section by looking at the traditional way of doing business 
between the vendor and the customer. We call it “independent decision making,” with no 
agreement between the parties. That case is the building block for VMI analyses. 
 
3.4 Independent Decision Making (Case 1) 
    This first case thus assumes that C and V, separately, each plan their own 
replenishments or production, respectively. End-user demand d is realized at the customer, 
who must decide, based on that demand, how often and in what quantity he should order 
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from the vendor. While doing so, the customer considers the ordering cost Ac and inventory 
holding cost hc.  
    In light of the preceding costs, the customer in Case 1 orders from the vendor a 





. It follows that the customer’s total cost in Case 1 is then  TCc1 
= cc dhA2 . Now, the vendor is informed by the customer of the ordering quantity q1. The 
vendor has production rate p ≥ d, and should satisfy the customer’s order fully since no 
backorders are allowed. In choosing her batch size Q1, the vendor considers the production 
setup cost (S), inventory holding cost (hv), and the cost per shipment release (av).  
    We assume without loss of generality that the vendor begins producing when the 
customer’s inventory level is q1. (This facilitates comparison of the several cases we 
consider.) During each cycle of length 'T  in Case 1, the vendor produces initially at a rate p, 
and total system inventory increases at rate p - d  during the uptime T . After production 
stops, the vendor supplies goods to the customer from her stock (until there are none left); 
system-wide inventory decreases at a rate d  until the end of the vendor’s cycle (see Figure 
3.3). All items that are carried over, i.e. that stay in the vendor’s cycle (during the uptime 
plus the downtime) are charged hv for holding inventory. Note that
T
qk
p 11=  where the 





)( 11 −+ ,  and 








11 −+ .  
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Figure 3.3: Inventory positions over time. H denotes the maximal system inventory, and    
T ′  the time between successive production start-ups.   
 
 
  Since we require Q1 ≥ q1, we state that there is a number of shipments k1 from the 
vendor to customer during the vendor’s cycle: Q1  =  k1q1. Note also that the transportation 
cost is paid by the customer, but the vendor pays av for every shipment released. Then, the 
vendor’s total cost is   
TCv1 = d [S/Q1 +  av /q1 ] + hv [q1 + ( )pd−1  Q1]     2                                  (1) 
    The first two terms in (1) correspond to production setup and shipment release costs, 
and the third and fourth to inventory carrying cost. The only variable in that equation is Q1. 
Treating the number of shipments as continuous, rather than discrete (which will be the 









=   = EPQ. We remark that since TCv1 is a strictly convex function 
in the interval ),0( ∞ , the optimal integer value for k is  
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=φ , and denoting C ′  = )/1(2 pdSdhv − , the result is 




C φγ ++′ .  
 Let us consider once more TCv1 = dS/Q1 + 
2
vh ( ) 11 Qpd−  +  d av /q1 + 
2
1qhv  . We 
remark that Q1 is constant no matter what quantity q1 the customer orders, hence C ′  is 
constant independent of q1. The second (circled) part of this total cost is a forced cost: The 
vendor has no influence on it. The customer’s decision q1 determines how much the vendor 
must pay. This explains a major motivation behind a VMI agreement, whereby V  seeks a 
way to get involved in ordering decisions to see if that second part of her total cost can be 
decreased.  
        Although the customer’s decision could be near-optimal, we will suppose that the 
vendor is not happy with the customer’s order quantity, and she wants to make replenishment 
decisions herself. V then offers C a VMI partnership that states: The vendor will make 
replenishment decisions on behalf of the customer, and will be responsible to pay any cost 
associated with it. Here, an “associated cost” does not include the expense for transportation, 
which is still assumed to be paid by the customer. (That will be relaxed later in our analysis.)  
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3.5 Vendor-Managed Inventory (Case 2) 
    With VMI, the vendor takes over from the customer the responsibility for 
replenishment. The customer does not place any order, hence pays no ordering charge, 
although the customer does pay its cost of holding stock. 
            The expense associated with the replenishment decision, i.e. the cost of issuing an 
order, was ao, as paid by the customer when he makes that decision. This parameter might be 
a different value for the vendor. Let us write that under the proposed VMI partnership, V will 
need to pay 1β ao for issuing an order, where 1β  ≥  0 can be interpreted as the vendor’s 
efficiency factor. (C will then be exempt from paying ao.)  
     Under VMI, the vendor pays 1β ao plus her costs that were discussed in Case 1. As 
such, the customer pays all his costs from Case 1 except ao. The proposed VMI partnership 
does not include sharing the transportation cost; it is still paid by the customer. Let Q2 be the 
production quantity in Case 2 and q2 be the replenishment quantity, which is now determined 
by the vendor on behalf of the customer. The vendor can then find optimal values of Q2 and 
q2 that minimize her total cost TCv2, where  








TC vvv −++++= β .  
Note that q2 is now also a decision variable for the vendor.  
Proposition 1: For a continuous number of shipments ,2k the optimal 2Q  = 1Q  = EPQ 
independent of q2, the minimum system-wide inventory. 












qaadqf vov ++= β . These 
functions, each convex over ),0( ∞ , can be optimized separately.  
The optimal value for f thus occurs when   






.               ■ 
Minimizing ( )2qf , the vendor finds the replenishment  quantity under VMI as 


















=φ . Then  
2q   = 
φ
δβγ 11+  1q  = 1qm , 
where we define 
φ
ψ
=m   and  11 δβγψ += . 
    Now we want to find 2vTC  and 2cTC , and to see how they compare with results from 
Case 1. Basically, we want to know if this VMI partnership can help us achieve some of the 
following: 
i. 12 vv TCTC < : cost saving for the vendor 
ii. 12 cc TCTC < : cost saving for the customer 
iii. 1122 cvcv TCTCTCTC +<+ : system-wide cost savings 
To categorize the results of the two systems, we will state that  
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• VMI is an efficient system if both the vendor and the customer are better off 
compared to Case 1: Both (i) and (ii) hold. The VMI partnership is clearly acceptable 
to both parties.  
• In a potentially-efficient system, although one party is better off, the other is worse off 
while VMI achieves system-wide cost savings: Both (iii), and either (i) or (ii), hold. If 
so, we can look for a way to adjust the partnership so that no party is worse off.  
• An inefficient system means system-wide cost under VMI exceeds that of Case 1, 
hence (iii) does not hold.  
   Note that each statement (i) – (iii) is a strict inequality. We shall often emphasize this 
by saying “positive cost savings.” Based on cost comparisons, we can infer Propositions 2 
through 5, proofs of which are contained in the Appendix A.  
Proposition 2: Under VMI, the vendor achieves positive cost savings if and only if 
112 δβγφφγ +>+ , i.e. if and only if ( ) φγ 12 −> m . 
Proposition 3: Under VMI, the customer achieves positive cost savings if and only if 
113211 )(2 δβγδδφδβγφ +++>+ , that is, if and only if ( ) ,1
2
1 −> mδ  
where ct Aa /2 =δ , cr Aa /3 =δ , and 1321 =++ δδδ . Equivalently, for a fixed value of 1δ , 
the customer will achieve positive cost savings under VMI if and only if 
11 11 δδ +<<− m . 
Proposition 4: If φδβγ <+ 11  when γφ > , or if γφ <  when φδβγ >+ 11 ,  
then VMI will yield positive system-wide cost savings. That is, VMI will enable positive 
system-wide cost savings if and only if ( ) ( ) 01212 1
2 <−+++−+ δφγφ mm . 
Lemma 1: If 1βφ < , both parties cannot simultaneously be better off.   
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Proof: A necessary (but not sufficient) condition that both parties be better off together is  
1132 )( δβγδδφφγ +++>+  
111)1( δβδφφ +−>⇒ , which implies 1βφ >                     ■ 
 
  We remark that if 1β = 1, VMI cannot be an efficient system if the vendor’s inventory 
holding cost is smaller than the customer’s. Note also that, to tell when (i) and (ii) hold 
together, requires knowledge of at least the ranges of parameters. We will provide examples 
later.  
   Consider the case when (iii) is true, but only (i) or (ii) holds. This means either 
• The customer is better off: Here a VMI partnership is not applicable since V (who 
offered the partnership) is worse off, and there is no incentive for C to share his cost 
savings with the vendor (the customer already pays the transportation cost). 
• The vendor is better off: C, now worse off, will not consent to VMI unless V offers an 
additional incentive, so that the customer’s cost is no greater than in Case 1. One such 
incentive is “transportation cost sharing”: The vendor shares C’s transportation cost 
(at) so that, overall, the customer does not suffer under VMI. That is, the vendor pays 
ta)1( 2α−  , and the customer pays ta2α  per shipment, where  0 < 2α < 1. 
Proposition 5: A potentially-efficient VMI arrangement, where the vendor is better off, can 
be turned into an efficient system by setting   















    ■ 
Note that, when the customer pays just the fraction 2α of transportation cost, he is now no 
worse off than in Case 1; the vendor is still better off, and all the savings are captured by the 
vendor.  
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    As another way of sharing the cost savings, consider a payment from the vendor to the 
customer in the form of a price discount. Suppose that the customer (originally) pays $ c per 





y −= . Such a price discount is an alternative to the sharing of 
transportation cost. Either incentive can turn a potentially-efficient VMI system, where the 
vendor is better off, into an efficient one, benefitting both actors. (We remark that, in light of 
our cost assumptions, those two incentives are the only means available to share the savings 
in total cost.) 
    Our analyses up to now were for a vendor and customer that were independent 
decision makers in a supply chain. We played the role of an outside observer to see the 
impacts of VMI. That is, we investigated if it was possible to keep the independence of the 
actors and achieve efficiency at the same time.  
    Let us next assume that there is a third party who has control over both vendor and 
customer, and also has enough information on each of their particular cost parameters. This 
will be true if the vendor and customer belong to a single corporate entity, hence are 
vertically integrated.  
 
3.6 Central Decision Making (Case 3) 
    We now analyze the system from the point of view of this third party, and call it 
“central decision making.” As in JELS models, there is a single total cost function denoted 
by TCsys that includes all expenses of both the vendor and customer. Assume also that 1β = 1 
when comparing Cases 2 and 3, since a vertical integration implies the capture of all possible 
efficiencies created by any of the supply chain members. Total cost in Case 3 is then   
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Observe that Proposition 1 still holds. When TCsys  is minimized, optimal production and 






















Note that if φγ = , then q3 = q1: The customer is replenishing at the system-wide optimal 
quantity anyway. There is then no need for a contract to decrease overall total costs; they are 





cc dhAγφ +−+ =  011 ≥−+ syscv TCTCTC . 












 =  022 ≥−+ syscv TCTCTC . 
Both of the equations above show that the lowest system-wide cost can be achieved through 
central decision making. In the next section, computational examples will highlight this point 
as well as the previous analytical results.   
 
3.7 Numerical Examples 
    We now consider a series of examples to contrast the Cases 1 - 3. The following values 
are taken throughout: == cA,2.01δ $100 per order, =ch  $1.5 per item stored, 1600=p  
items/year and d = 1300 items/year in each example. Dollar values of total costs require only 
the preceding parameters, plus of course the “ratios” defined in our analysis: 1,, βγφ . In 
Figs. 3.4 through 3.11, generally two of those ratios are fixed, while the third is varied. In 
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each case, that range of variation has encompassed a factor of 40: ( )[ ]41.01.0 , i.e. between 
values of 0.1 and 4.0, in steps of 0.1. 
    When a ratio, say φ , is fixed at level 1φ  in one set of graphs, it may be fixed at level 
2φ  in the next set. The levels 21 , φφ  (and similarly for the iγ  in their respective graphs) are 
chosen strategically, such that qualitatively different behaviour is observed for 1φ  vs 2φ . (We 
remark that 11 =β  in every figure except Figs. 3.8 and 3.9.) In discussing Figs. 3.4 – 3.11, 
we usually first compare Case 2 to Case 1 and then comment on the differences between each 
of those and Case 3. TCi in those figures denotes the total system cost for Case i.  
VMI vs Independent Decision Making 
Example 1: ]4)1.0(1.0[,5.1 == γφ  













































TCv1 - TCv2 TCc1-TCc2 TC1-TC2
 
   Figure 3.4: Comparison of Cases 1 and 2;  φ = 1.5 
 
          Since φ  > 1,  hv > hc. It is then possible to observe some intervals where both parties 
are better off. Figure 3.4 shows that VMI is an efficient system if γ  is within [0.3, 0.4] or 
γ   
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within [2.6, 2.9]. It is inefficient when γ  lies within [1.4, 2], but potentially efficient for the 
remaining γ .  
Example 2: ]4)1.0(1.0[,8.0 == γφ   
Here, hv < hc, so VMI cannot be efficient (Fig. 3.5). System-wide cost savings occur when γ  
is within [0.1, 0.6] or [2 , 4]. In these ranges, there are two possibilities: 
• C is better off while V is worse off: ∈γ  [0.1, 0.6]. Not much can be done, since (as 
discussed before) there is no incentive for the customer to share his cost savings. 
• The vendor is better off while the customer is worse off: ∈γ  [2, 4]. Here, V can share 
her cost savings with C to achieve an efficient system. Suppose γ  =  2.4, 2δ  = 0.7,  
and the mechanism chosen is transportation-cost sharing. By Proposition 5, 1- 2α  =  
0.635 : VMI can be an efficient system if V pays 63.5 % of total transportation cost. 
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 Vertical Integration vs VMI or Base Case 
    We previously concluded that Case 3 provides the minimum system-wide cost, hence a 
lower bound for the cost of any virtual integration between the vendor and customer. Figs. 
3.6 and 3.7,  on Examples 1 and 2, show that (TC1 - TC3) and (TC2 - TC3) are non-negative. 
Differences between graphs in each figure basically give the cost improvement from Base 
Case to VMI. Hence, interpretation of ranges that create potentially-efficient and inefficient 
systems remains the same. 

















































    Figure 3.6: Comparison of Cases 1-3; φ  = 1.5 
 
           The numerical examples we provided are thus in line with our analytical results. In the 
next two sections, these will be summarized and conclusions will be presented, following 
additional discussion of our findings. 
γ  
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    Figure 3.9: Impacts of 1β  when =φ  0.8 
 
3.8 Further Discussion 
    Most observers, whether academics or practitioners, would feel that VMI is, in 
general, either better or worse than the traditional business approach. Rather, the results of 
this paper show that the success of VMI depends greatly on the cost parameters of the parties 
involved. Hence, there are cases where both actors are better off (requires  ,/ 1βφ >= cv hh  
the vendor’s efficiency factor). There are also cases where  
only the customer is better off:  ( )[ φγ 12 −≤ m   and ]11 11 δδ +<<− m ;  
only the vendor is better off : ( )[ φγ 12 −> m  and one of : 11 δ−≤m or 
]11 δ+≥m ; or neither party is better off: ( )[ φγ 12 −≤ m and one of 11 δ−≤m or 




ψ 11+==m . We emphasize that each of the 
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conditions in square brackets is both necessary and sufficient for that particular case. Those 
general inequalities can be verified on the given regions in any of Figs. 3.4 – 3.11.  
    More can be said, in terms of individual cost parameters, if we go back to our closed-
form results of Propositions 2-5. We are particularly interested in Outcome (iii), system-wide 
cost savings under VMI, where the vendor’s costs have decreased more than the customer’s 











which can be seen after some algebra. That is, the customer’s efforts to decrease his own 
inventory-carrying costs, combined with VMI, result in greater savings. 
    VMI may be efficient, potentially efficient, or inefficient, when φ and γ  have other 
relative values. In those cases, the difference in system costs due to VMI depends strongly on 
1β . This is observed in Figs. 3.8 and 3.9, where γ
φ  is respectively 3.0 and 1.6. 
    Recall that, when the vendor orders on behalf of the customer, it costs her o1aβ , 
compared  to simply oa  when the customer orders on his own. It is thus reasonable to view 
( )11 β−  as the degree to which the vendor is “more efficient.” 
   We see that in Fig. 3.8, even when 4.11 =β , there are system-wide cost savings. That 
situation, namely a potentially efficient system under VMI, requires in Fig. 3.9 that the 
vendor V be at least as efficient as the customer C. 
    As V  becomes more efficient, i.e. as 1β decreases, her costs clearly decrease. System-
wide costs decrease as well. In fact, the latter is true even when the customer’s savings are 
increasing in 1β  (Fig. 3.8). As far as concerns the vendor’s savings, we observe in Fig. 3.8 
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that V need only be 20% more efficient than C, to achieve savings for herself. Contrast this 
with Fig. 3.9, where she must be 90% more efficient. 
    Let us now turn to the impact of φ . This parameter is allowed to vary in Figs. 3.10 and 
3.11, where γ  is respectively fixed at 1.5 and 0.8, all other data remaining unchanged from 
previous examples. In both figures, the VMI system is inefficient for 0.1<φ  or so. Figure 
3.10 exhibits a wider range of φ  for which the system is potentially efficient. The wider 
range in Fig. 3.11 corresponds to the system being efficient: The smaller value of γ  permits 
the savings of each party under VMI to respond more quickly to an increment in φ . 
 
































































    Figure 3.10: Impacts of φ  when =γ  1.5   
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    Figure 3.11: Impacts ofφ  when =γ  0.8  
 
3.9 Summary and Conclusions 
   We have considered a VMI agreement between a vendor V and customer C who 
initially acted independently. With that agreement, V could make replenishment decisions on 
behalf of C, but would incur the cost to issue an order. We identified three possible outcomes 
of VMI: 
• An efficient system where both the vendor and the customer are better off. This is 
possible only when 1βφ > .  
• A potentially-efficient system if there are system-wide cost savings, and either the 
customer or the vendor is better off. If we get a potentially-efficient system, we can 
turn it into an efficient one (when the vendor is the better-off party) through 
transportation-cost sharing or a price discount. 
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• An inefficient system if 2211 vcvc TCTCTCTC +<+ . VMI causes an increase in the 
system’s total cost.  
 System-wide total cost function changes when 1β  is included in Case 2. Even when 1β = 
1, that function takes different values depending on which party is responsible for ordering. 
In each of the three cases we considered, the decision maker is another party of the same 
supply chain. Although the cost parameters may remain the same, total costs of the supply 
chain and its members differ based on who makes replenishment decisions.  
Assuming that it is financially and culturally feasible, Case 3 (Central decision making) 
would provide the best possible system-wide cost. Table 3.1 summarizes the analytical 
results we obtained in the three cases. Proposition 1 and its proof explain why the vendor’s 
production batch size remains the same in Cases 1-3.  
   We remark that our findings are “general,” in the following sense. The formulations 
account for relevant cost parameters of each party; no inequalities between parameter values 
have been assumed in advance. In a particular application, there will be specific numerical 
figures. The preceding results permit determination of whether VMI is efficient or potentially 
efficient or not.  
   Our analyses indicate, in many instances, that either the customer alone or the vendor 
alone captures the savings generated by VMI. Even so, a change from independent decision 
making is often worthwhile. VMI is beneficial overall (Proposition 4) if and only if  
( ) ( ) 01212 1
2 <−+++−+ δφγφ mm . 
The better-off vendor can compensate the customer to the point that his losses are neutralized 
(Proposition 5). 
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           Future research might include several products or customers. If there were two 
products, both managed under VMI by V for C, consolidated shipments of a mixed load 
could be dispatched to C. But the non-VMI case now is also more interesting, namely 
“coordinated inventory control,” i.e. joint replenishment by C of SKUs ordered from the 
same supplier, V. 
          In the case of two customers 1C , 2C , even a single product could be shipped from V to 
a cross-dock (CD; e.g. Gümüş and Bookbinder 2004), followed by transport over shorter 
distances to each iC  individually. And whether or not a CD is employed, a route that 
combines deliveries to the two iC  is a separate option. 
          The point is that two products and/or two customers would allow additional economies 
in inventory or transportation decisions, both for VMI and non-VMI. To capitalize on the 
richness of the new examples, however, will again require precise treatment of the cost 
parameters, and care in allocating particular expenses to each actor. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of analytical results.      * Excludes the fixed cost C ′  
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Appendix A 
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,  cAa 10 δ= ,  cv Aa γ=  and cv hh φ= , we then have 
 
2vTC   =  +′C  cc hdA2)( 11 δβγφ + . 
 
Let vvv TCTC Γ=− 21  denote the vendor’s savings, the decrease in costs due to VMI. 
   
Because cc dhA > 0,  0>Γv  if  and only if )(
2
1
φγ +  − )(2 11 δβγφ +  >  0 
That is, the vendor’s savings are positive if and only if  112 δβγφφγ +>+ ,  i.e. if 
and only if ( ) φγ 12 −> m .                                  ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3: 1cTC   =  cc dhA2  





















Based on 2q  as well as 1321 =++ δδδ ,  











Let ccc TCTC Γ=− 21  denote the customer’s savings under VMI. We find 0>Γc  if  and 
only if [ ])1()(2 11111 δφδβγδβγφ −++−+   >  0, i.e. if and only if ( )
2
1 1−> mδ .
   
The latter is easily seen to be equivalent to  11 11 δδ +<<− m  .       ■ 
 
 60 
Proof of Proposition 4: 






























We will have sysΓ  >  0 (system-wide cost savings) if and only if 
[ ])1()12()2( 1δφψφψφφγ −++−++   > 0.  That condition is equivalent to  
( ) ( ) )1()1()1(
11 1111
−>+−+++− βδφγφφδβγδβγφ                                (1) 
One sees from the right-hand side of (1) that, if 11 =β , a necessary and sufficient 
condition for system-wide cost savings is that both factors on the left have the same sign. 
When both factors are positive, that necessary and sufficient condition reduces to        













 ,                           (2) 
while if both factors are negative, the corresponding condition is        













.                      (3) 
When 11 <β , the right-hand side of inequality (1) is negative, hence each of conditions 
(2) and (3) is sufficient (but not necessary) for system-wide cost savings. In the case that 
11 >β , inequalities (2) and (3) are now alternative statements of necessary (but not 
sufficient) conditions for overall cost savings under VMI.  
To combine the three cases, recall that 
φ
ψ
=m  . We have after some algebra that VMI 
enables positive system-wide cost savings if and only if 
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                                            ( ) ( ) 01212 1
2 <−+++−+ δφγφ mm .                ■ 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Initially, 012 >− cc TT .  Now the vendor pays ta)1( 2α−  so that the customer is not worse 
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4. Impact of Consignment Inventory and Vendor Managed 






Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) and Consignment Inventory (CI) are supply-chain 
sourcing practices between a vendor and customer. VMI allows the vendor to initiate orders 
on behalf of the customer. This presumably benefits the vendor who can then make 
replenishment decisions according to her own preferences. In CI, as in the usual independent-
sourcing approach to doing business, the customer has authority over the timing and quantity 
of replenishments. CI seems to favour the customer because, in addition, he pays for the 
goods only upon use. Our main aim in this paper is to analyze CI in supply chains under 
deterministic demand, and provide some general conditions under which CI creates benefits 
for the vendor, for the customer, and the whole chain. We also consider similar issues for the 
combined use of CI and VMI. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
         Planning, sourcing raw materials, making the product and delivering to customers are 
typical operational processes for a company within a supply chain. Here we consider a 
customer who purchases goods from a vendor. The customer’s processes comprise the 
planning of his requirements; sourcing goods from the vendor; and releasing those goods to 
end-consumers. The vendor, similarly, plans her requirements and sources materials/parts for 
production, manufactures goods, and releases those goods to the customer. 
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         When these two firms are independent and linked in a supply chain as in Figure 4.1, 
decisions concerning operational processes are, in general, made individually. In the usual 
sequence of events, the customer first develops his requirements plan and sourcing method 
based on his own costs. The vendor then reacts to fulfill the customer’s requirements. Hence, 
replenishment decisions made by the customer do not necessarily consider his upstream 







Figure 4.1: The supply chain between the vendor and customer: The primary interrelated 
operations are the customer’s plan and source choices, and the corresponding make and deliver 
decisions of the vendor.  
 
          A common focus of research and supply chain practice is to seek mechanisms to align 
the decisions of chain members by means of contracts or agreements. Those arrangements 
aim to increase the overall supply chain performance. Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), 
one such agreement, was analyzed by Gümüş et al. (2006) to obtain conditions under which 
it may lower the costs of each party and of the chain.  
         There are, however, other practices that seem to unbalance the total costs of supply-
chain members. In this paper, we will analyze in detail one of those practices, Consignment 
Inventory (CI). Our aim is, similarly, to determine conditions whereby consignment stocks 
create benefits for the customer, the vendor, or for both parties.   
   Make    Deliver     Plan    Source 
Vendor’s Facility Customer’s Facility  
Goods 
   Make     Plan    Deliver    Source 
The supply chain between the two parties 
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         In CI, goods are owned by the vendor until they are used by the customer. Those goods 
are stored at the customer’s premises. Although the customer may have authority over the 
timing and quantity of orders, he pays for the goods only upon use. Hence, the customer does 
not tie up his capital in inventory.    
          In the traditional way of doing business, which we will call “Inventory Sourcing (IS)” 
throughout, the customer orders from the vendor based on his total inventory holding costs 
(both costs of opportunity and physical storage, where opportunity cost refers to the cost of 
capital), and costs of ordering. Inventory sourcing is generally characterized by a purchasing 
contract including shipment terms, annual demand specified by the customer, and the price 
per unit purchased by him. Under this practice, which will be our base case for analysis, the 
customer makes a payment to the vendor once the goods arrive at his premises (see Figure 






Figure 4.2: The customer’s sourcing activities: Transfer of ownership in Inventory Sourcing 
and Consignment Inventory 
 
            In CI, ownership of goods is transferred to the customer only after they leave his in-
house warehouse for production. If other terms of the purchasing contract stay the same as in 
IS, one major benefit to the customer is deferral of payment until production. When end-
consumer demand is unknown, CI also allows the customer to hedge against uncertainties in 
production and sales. This will influence his total inventory carrying cost.  Because the 
           Material  
              Warehousing  
           Selling            Material  
              Inspection 
           Goods 
             Receipt 
           Purchase  
               Order/Release  
                  Order 
Transfer of Ownership in 
Inventory Sourcing 
Transfer of Ownership in 
Consignment Inventory 
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customer’s inventory assets are now off his balance sheet, conventional wisdom holds that 
the customer benefits most from CI.  
            The benefits of CI are less clear for the vendor. One situation which favours CI is 
where the vendor offers new products that the customer hesitates to buy, or expensive items 
difficult for the customer to own.  In that case, the vendor can use CI as a strategic means to 
create new sales channels (Piasecki, 2004).    This motivation, however, does not explain 
why a vendor would accept a CI contract when demand is stable and the material purchased 
is not new.  
            An example of such is seen in the Automation and Drives division of Siemens, where 
standard parts such as metal springs and nuts can be consigned from suppliers even though 
the demand during a year can be quite stable.  Other scenarios when a vendor might accept a 
CI contract include a power differential between a strong customer and a ‘weaker’ vendor 
who needs to accommodate the customer’s wishes, or when the vendor at least has sufficient 
power to negotiate more favourable terms in the CI agreement.           
There appears to be very little previous work that examines analytically the impact of  
CI. The focus of the present paper is to establish analytical results that specify general 
conditions under which CI is beneficial to one or both parties.  To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no academic work that treats CI in this context.  
           In the literature, CI is mostly taken to be synonymous with VMI or with CI plus VMI 
(“C&VMI”).  In VMI, replenishment decisions are made by the vendor on behalf of the 
customer.  In CI, even though the vendor is informed about the consumption of goods at the 
customer’s premises, it is still the customer who finalizes the timing and quantity of orders. 
We will consider both types of agreements in this paper. 
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     The framework we use is similar to those in Joint Economic Lot Sizing (JELS) 
decisions.   The JELS literature generally assumes a central decision maker that can optimize 
the sum of total costs of the vendor plus the customer. The context is very similar in each 
paper, and the contributions are incremental.  
     Banarjee (1986), the first to analyze the integrated vendor-buyer case, examines a lot-
for-lot model in which the vendor V manufactures each shipment as a separate batch. Goyal 
(1988) extends this work in that he formulates a joint total-relevant-cost model for a single 
vendor and customer production-inventory system, where the vendor’s lot size is an integer 
multiple of the customer’s order size. Lu (1995) extended Goyal’s (1988) work by allowing 
V to supply some quantity to the purchaser before completing the entire lot. Goyal (1995) 
employed the example provided by Lu for the single vendor and buyer but showed that a 
different shipment policy could result in a better solution. 
      Hill (1997) considers a single vendor who manufactures a product at a finite rate and 
in batches, and supplies a sole buyer whose external demand is level and fixed. Each batch is 
sent to the buyer in a number of shipments. The vendor incurs a batch setup cost and a fixed 
order or delivery cost associated with each shipment. Hill’s policy assumes that successive 
shipment sizes increase by a factor whose value lies between one and the ratio of 
manufacturing rate to the product’s demand rate. He concludes that, although Goyal’s (1995) 
policy may perform much better than Lu’s equal-size-shipment policy, his own policy 
outperforms all.  
   Similar to the JELS literature, we use a base case (IS) for comparison purposes, 
contrasting that to other models which assume that the parties in the supply chain still make 
decisions independently (whether coordinated or not).  
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    JELS studies do not discuss how the savings created by central decision making should 
be divided between the parties involved. Benefits achieved are difficult to generalize and the 
cost models are not analyzed in detail. For example, the customer’s ordering cost is not 
explicit in those models. The CI or C&VMI sourcing models that we consider require a shift 
of certain costs from one actor to another to reflect changes in decision-making responsibility 
or ownership of inventory. We provide a breakdown of cost parameters so as to identify the 
impact of such changes on each member. 
    Sucky (2005) extends EOQ and JELS to a bargaining model, where the vendor offers 
a side payment to the customer whose costs under JELS go up compared to individual 
decision making. It is assumed that the vendor, who achieves cost savings under JELS, 
makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer of joint policy with a side-payment.  The customer may 
accept the vendor’s offer, or if he is not satisfied with it, can enforce his EOQ. The 
bargaining then ends. Sucky assumes that the vendor has full information regarding the 
customer’s costs.   
     A number of papers have also been written on combined use of CI and VMI.  This 
literature discusses various C&VMI systems that differ in the costs considered, the demand 
structure, and the nature and number of supply-chain members involved. 
    Boyaci and Gallego (2002) study a system of a single wholesaler and retailer under 
deterministic but price-sensitive demand. They analyze the impacts of coordinating pricing 
and replenishment when decisions are made jointly. They use wholesaler-owned inventory 
with delayed payment vs consignment inventory to extend the models of Crowther (1964) 
and Monahan (1984). They conclude that pricing and inventory decisions are best made with 
a coordinated-channel’s profit function. 
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        In our paper, we analyze the impacts of CI from the operational point of view. That 
is, under CI, there is no change in pricing terms from those in the purchasing contract under 
inventory sourcing. This enables us to focus on operational benefits to both parties. If one 
party is not satisfied with the outcome, a price change may then become an option, as it 
would be in industry.   
             Valentini and Zavanella (2003) describe the technique of consignment stock by a 
case study of a manufacturer providing parts to the automotive industry. In that example, the 
vendor manages the inventory of her customer using an (s, S) policy. While the authors’ main 
aim was to qualitatively analyze the advantages and disadvantages of this sourcing practice, 
they compare it numerically with Hill’s (1997) solution, using the same deterministic model. 
Although they include the customer’s opportunity and storage cost of inventory separately, 
they omit his ordering cost totally. Based on numerical examples only, they come to the 
conclusion that consignment stock outperforms the usual inventory models.  
            Persona et al. (2005) build on the analysis provided by Valentini and Zavanella 
(2003) using the same assumptions concerning characteristics of the agreement. In their 
paper, they analyze the consequences of product obsolescence, concluding that obsolescence 
decreases the optimal level of consignment stock.   
             There are also publications that examine C&VMI in various contexts. For example, 
Dong and Xu (2002) explore the economics of C&VMI in the short and long terms. 
Moreover, Gerchak and Khmelnitsky (2003) provide an interesting example of C&VMI 
when demand is uncertain. They consider a retailer selling newspapers and his vendor (a 
publisher) under VMI and revenue sharing. They analyze the impacts of retailer’s sales report 
(to the publisher) on coordination. 
 72 
              Although we take both CI and VMI into account in this paper, the problem setting, 
the approach we use, and our goal are quite distinct from those of Dong and Xu(2002) or of 
Gerchak and Khmelnitsky (2003).  We consider a well-known problem but analyze it under 
different partnerships, accounting for changes in certain cost parameters. We provide closed-
form solutions to see under what conditions a partnership is more favourable than others. 
  
4.2 Problem Definition  
             Suppose a customer purchases a standard good from a vendor. Yearly demand is 
constant and is realized at the customer; there is no backordering. The vendor and customer 
are independent firms, each with the goal of minimizing their own total cost. 
            Under IS, the customer orders from the vendor based on his total cost of planning 
(fixed cost per order), sourcing (fixed cost per shipment received) and inventory holding 
(physical storage and opportunity cost of inventory). The vendor bears productioon setup 
costs, costs per shipment released to the customer, and inventory-holding costs for both 
work-in-process and finished goods not yet shipped to the customer.   
             The customer buys goods from the vendor based on a purchasing contract that 
specifies the (minimum) annual quantity, the price per item, and shipment terms. We assume 
that the price per item as well as shipment terms were negotiated between the two parties 
based on yearly requirements, and a shipment destination was set by the customer. Our aim is 
not to optimize these parameters by arranging a new purchasing contract between the two 
parties. Rather, we will compare different business-partnerships to see if any of them creates 
more benefits when the contract parameters are the same. 
             The customer in IS plans the optimal quantity and timing of his orders, and performs 
the sourcing from the vendor based on this plan.  The vendor releases shipments based on the 
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customer’s ordering decisions. When the customer receives the goods, he makes a payment 
to the vendor and thus owns the product from that point on. Until such items are sold to end-
consumers, inventory holding costs are accumulated at the customer.  
              Under CI, goods are owned by the vendor until they are used by the customer, i.e. 
until sold or employed as inputs in the customer’s manufacturing process. Although the 
customer pays physical storage costs (such as rent and electricity), he does not own the 
inventory and hence does not incur capital costs for holding that stock. Those carrying costs 
accrue to vendor. It is still the customer who sets the timing and quantity of orders. We will 
determine under what conditions consigning stocks creates benefits for the customer, the 
vendor and for both.   
We will also look at the use of CI and VMI combined. When CI is coupled with VMI, 
even though it is the vendor who pays the opportunity cost of goods stored at the customer, 
the vendor now also takes over responsibility for setting the quantity and timing of shipments 
released to the customer. This transfer of authority also shifts  the decision-making costs to 
the vendor,  but the vendor may benefit from this agreement by decreasing her total inventory 
holding cost. Table 4.1 identifies the three cases we consider and their major differences.      
           
 IS CI C&VMI 
Ordering decision made by C C V 
Bearer of ordering cost C C V 
Ownership of stock at customer C V V 
Bearer of opportunity cost C V V 
Table 4.1: Comparison of the basic characteristics of IS, CI, and C&VMI. C: the customer, V: the vendor  
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           The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 3 introduces our notation. In Section 
4, we develop a model for IS and find the analytical solution for our base case.   We then 
extend the base-case model to incorporate CI (Section 5) and C&VMI (Section 6), and 
compare those solutions to that of the base case. We provide numerical examples in Section 
7, while Section 8 includes a summary and our conclusions.  
 
4.3 Notation 
In developing our models for IS, CI, and C&VMI, the following basic notations  are used. 
Ac:  Customer’s fixed cost of ordering ($ per order).   
Ac consists of the cost of issuing an order, ao, and the cost per shipment received. The 
latter does not need to be defined separately.   
hc :  Annual cost to carry one unit in stock at customer’s retail store ($/unit/year).  
This per-item inventory holding cost is composed of ho , the opportunity cost, and the 
hs , the physical storage cost: hc  = ho  + hs .    
S :  Vendor’s fixed production setup cost incurred at the start of each cycle ($ per setup) 
av :  Vendor’s cost per shipment release ($ per shipment to the customer) 
hv :  Annual cost of holding a unit in inventory at the vendor’s production site ($/unit/year)   
      
p :  Vendor’s annual production rate (units/year)  
d :  Annual demand rate at the customer (units/year). 
 
           The vendor is assumed to have sufficient capacity to meet the customer’s demand 
(i.e., p ≥ d). In IS, each party pays its own costs as defined above. In CI and C&VMI, 
portions of Ac and/or hc are paid by the vendor on behalf of the customer. 
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           In all our formulation, the subscripts v and c refer to the vendor and customer 
respectively. Moreover, the subscripts 1, 2, and 3 are used both for variables and total costs 
in IS, CI, and C&VMI respectively.  
     In the next section, we analyze inventory sourcing, where there is no agreement 
between vendor and customer. Since it is the traditional way of doing business, we will take 
IS as the base case to contrast with CI and C&VMI. We note that in our analysis and 
comparisons of different agreements, the terms “better off” and “worse off” will respectively 
mean strictly lower and strictly higher costs the party in question.   
       
4.4 Inventory Sourcing (IS) 
      In IS, the customer first makes replenishment plans based on his costs Ac and hc , and 
the end-user demand d.  The customer’s decisions concern the frequency and in what 





 and his optimal total cost is TCc1 = cc dhA2 . The customer passes the 
replenishment decision to the vendor, who produces at a rate  p ≥ d.    
      The vendor, who must satisfy the customer’s orders fully, finds her economic 
production quantity (Q1)   based on her costs of production setup (S), inventory holding (hv), 
and shipment release (av).  
      To describe system inventory levels, we assume that the vendor switches from other 
SKUs and begins producing this item when the customer’s inventory level is q1. Starting at 
that moment, the vendor produces at a rate p during an interval 
p
kq
T = , where k is the 
number of shipments from the vendor to the customer during the vendor’s production cycle. 
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When the vendor is producing, the total system inventory increases at rate p - d .  After 
production stops, the vendor supplies goods to the customer from her stock until that is 
depleted. When the vendor is not producing, the system-wide inventory decreases at a rate 
d . We denote the time between successive production runs at the vendor by T ′  (see Figure 
4.3). The vendor’s total production quantity in her cycle is Q1 = kq1. All items carried by the 
vendor are charged holding costs at a rate hv..  





)( 11 −+ , 








11 −+ . The vendor’s total cost per period is 
then  
TCv1 = d [S/Q1 +  av /q1 ] + hv [q1 + ( )pd−1  Q1]     2                            (1) 
    
 
Figure 4.3: Inventory positions over time. H denotes the maximal system inventory, and  T ′  
the time between successive production start-ups.    
  The first two terms in (1) are the total production setup and shipment release costs, and 
the third and fourth terms are inventory carrying costs. To be able to compare different 
partnerships analytically, will assume throughout that the number of shipments per cycle is a 
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=φ , and denoting C ′  = )/1(2 pdSdhv − , the total costs for the 




C φγ ++′ . The system-wide cost under 
inventory sourcing (TCc1 + TCv1) is therefore cc dhACTC 2]2/)(1[1 φγ +++′= .  
           The preceding model developed for the base case assumed no agreement between 
customer and vendor. When there is a CI or C&VMI agreement, its benefits will be reckoned 
with respect to total costs found under inventory sourcing.  The first type of agreement, CI, is 
the topic of next section. 
 
4.5 Consignment Inventory (CI) 
           The customer maintains control over the timing and quantity of orders under a CI 
agreement, and pays cA  every time he places an order. However, he does not incur the 
opportunity-cost portion of carrying inventory, since the vendor owns the goods at the 
customer’s premises until they are used.   
 78 










=2ε  (where 
121 =+ εε ) of portions of the customer’s inventory holding cost per item ( ch ) under IS. The 























==  which is strictly greater than 1q  since 11 <ε .  His optimal total cost 
under CI is then  112 csc TCdhA ε= , which is strictly less than 1cTC .  Therefore, the 
customer is always  better off under CI when compared to IS.  
The vendor, who bears the opportunity cost of goods stored at the customer, faces 
less-frequent shipments under CI than IS. (We assume for now that when the vendor orders 
on behalf of the customer,  there is no “efficiency factor,” that is, she pays the same 
opportunity cost oh  as the customer.) If we denote  the vendor’s production batch size by 2Q , 
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 , and hence her optimal 
























v +++′=   (where C ′  is as defined in IS). We can also write this 









CTC . Recall from IS that  
( ) 2/1 ccv dhACTC φγ ++′= . The vendor is better off under CI if and only if 21 vv TCTC > . 




 >0) :  
( ) ( )111 1 εφγεφγε −++>+ . Then, ( ) ( ) ( )( )11111 111 εεεφεεγ +−+−>− . Since 
01 1 >− ε , 
                                                       11 1 εφγε ++>                                                           (2) 
Proposition 1: A necessary condition for the vendor to be better off in a CI agreement is 
2+> φγ  
Proof: We see in (2) that 1)1(1 +>− φγε . Since φ  and 1ε  are greater than zero, 



















. Hence,  
2+> φγ .                                                                                                                                  ■ 
 Proposition 1 states that the vendor will be better off under a CI agreement if her cost 






A +2 , where cA  is the customer’s ordering cost. 
We also see that (2) is more likely to hold as the ratio cv hh /  decreases.  Consider, for 
example, an inventory sourcing agreement where the vendor delivers the goods to the 
customer’s premises and pays transportation costs. Let va′  be the vendor’s total fixed cost of 
transporation and shipment released per vehicle dispathced from her premises. (Note that va′  
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can replace va  in the models without changing the nature of analysis.) That va′  is expected to 
be much greater than the customer’s cost per shipment-received.  
           Moreover, it is likely that some of the vendor’s shipment costs are passed on to the 
customer through an increased price per item. Hence, his inventory holding cost can be much 
higher than the vendor’s. A consignment agreement in such a setting is then more likely to 
create benefits for both parties.       
What happens if condition (2) does not hold? There are two possible cases: 
(i) CI achieves system-wide cost savings where the customer is no worse off but the vendor 
is worse off. In practice, there is recourse for the vendor if this happens: If the vendor has 
sufficient bargaining power, she may be able to negotiate a better price.  Alternatively, if the 
vendor does not have this power, she may simply accept the terms to maintain her business 
with the customer. 
(ii) The System-wide cost is greater in CI than in IS. Then, it is in neither party’s interest to 
change the traditional way of doing business.  
            To explore these two possible situations, we formulate the total cost under a CI 
agreement and compare it with inventory sourcing. The system-wide cost under CI is 








Recall from IS that ( ) cccc dhAdhACTC 22
2
1
1 +++′= φγ  
Therefore, CI leads to system-wide cost savings if 21 TCTC > , which requires 

























φγ cccc dhAdhA                                 (3) 
Proposition 2: A necessary condition to achieve system-wide cost savings under CI is γφ < . 
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Proof: Since cc dhA2 and 1ε are greater than zero, the following sequence of inequalities 
must be satisfied  for (3) to hold:  
( ) ( ) 1111 212 εεφγεφγε +−++>++   
 
⇒  )1()1()1()1( 111 +++>+++ φγεφεγε   
 
⇒  ( ) ( )111 1)1(1)1( εφεγε −+>−+  .  
 


















. Therefore, it is necessary that 
γφ < .                                                                                                                                         ■ 
           Proposition 2 implies that if the vendor is relatively more efficient in inventory 
holding costs than for shipment release costs, it is more likely she achieves costs savings 
under CI. Intuitively, the customer’s replenishment quantities increase under CI compared to 
IS. That increase can be beneficial for the vendor, who prefers fewer shipments if her cost 
per shipment relase is high.  
          This concludes the analytical results for a basic CI agreement, where the vendor pays 
exactly the same opportunity cost per item, oh , that the customer pays in IS. Also, we 
assume that the wholesale price of an item does not change when the type of sourcing is CI. 
A summary of our findings is presented in Table 4.2 (note that 1/)1( εφ +=m ).  
          In the next two subsections, we will analyze the impacts of the vendor’s efficiency on 








Benefits under CI compared to IS Necessary and 
Sufficient Condition Customer Vendor Supply Chain 
11 +<<− mm γ  Better off Worse off Better off 
1+= mγ  Better off No worse off Better off 
1+> mγ  Better off Better off Better off 
1−= mγ  Better off Worse off No worse off 
1−< mγ  Better off Worse off Worse off 
Table 4.2: Summary of conditions when CI is beneficial for the customer, the vendor, and the whole system; 
1/)1( εφ +=m  
 
 
4.5.1 Impacts of the vendor’s efficiency factor 
          We previously assumed that the vendor pays oh  on behalf of the customer in a CI 
agreement. However, various considerations might create a situation where the capital costs 
of holding inventory for the vendor and the customer may not be the same.  For example, an 
organization’s capabilities in financing, and the firm’s relative power in industry, can make 
tremendous changes in capital costs.  
          In a CI agreement, let oh2β  be what the vendor pays per unit held at the customer’s 
premises. 2β  > 0 represents the vendor’s capital cost efficicency compared to the customer. 
We will now determine how this parameter changes our cost analysis.  
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         Comparison of 2vTC and 1vTC  shows that the vendor is better off if the following 
sequence of inequalities holds. 
( ) )1( 1211 εβφγεφγε −++>+  
 
⇒ ( ) ( ) ( )( )112111 1111 εεβεφεγε +−+−>− . Since 01 1 >− ε ,  
)1( 121 εβφγε ++> .  A necessary condition for this inequality to be satisfied is 2βγ > . 










         Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we now see that a neccesary condition for the 
vendor to be better off is 22βφγ +> . 

















cc dhACTC . 










> . Again as in the proof of Prospostion 2, it is necessary that 
222 βφγ +>+ . 
         The above analysis shows that the system-wide costs, as well as the vendor’s costs 
improve as 2β , the vendor’s cost factor, gets smaller. A CI agreement is more promising for 
both parties when the vendor can develop efficiencies in the opportunity cost of capital.     
         Even if the vendor is unable to develop these efficiencies, CI can create a situation 
where there is potential to lower system-wide costs, but not at the expense of one party. We 
call this a “potentially efficient system”.  We will examine this in detail in the next 
subsection.    
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4.5.2 Cost Sharing 
         We showed that, compared to IS,  the customer is always better off in a CI agreement. 
Consequently, a potentially efficient system in CI is a situation where the vendor is worse off 
but there are system-wide costs savings.  
          A potentially efficient  system can be turned into an efficient one by some sort of an 
incentive offered by the customer to transfer a portion of his benefits to the vendor. When CI 
is applied, it is customary in industry that the vendor be allowed to increase the unit price to 
share total savings. Without getting into details on cost-sharing research, we briefly explain 
how this could work.  
         Let c be the original price per item paid by the customer. The vendor suggests a price 
increment over c in order to make CI beneficial to herself. Let highy  be the maximum 


















          Without information sharing between parties, the customer may be unsure that a price 
increase is in his best interest (e.g. when he receives an equal, or even smaller, share of 
system-wide savings due to CI). 
           We now determine the smallest price increment acceptable to the vendor, the value 
that makes her no worse off than under IS. We assume that inequality (2) does not hold; this 










































       
           Note that the maximum price increase the customer will accept is highy , and it is the 
upper bound on the price increase that would erase his benefits under CI. On the other hand, 
lowy  is the lower bound that would compensate the vendor for her increase in costs, but still 
leave the customer with some benefit. Therefore, when CI creates a potentially efficient 
system, a wholesale price increment ],( highlow yy∈  will make the vendor willing to accept the 
CI agreement rather than inventory sourcing. The customer will be in favour of CI as long as 
price increments are in the range ),[ highlow yy .  
          Another means of creating possible cost savings for both vendor and customer may be 
the use of CI and VMI combined. While CI always benefits the customer, VMI has the 
potential of creating benefits for the vendor. CI plus VMI will be the subject of next section.   
 
4.6 Consignment and Vendor Managed Inventory (C&VMI) 
           In a C&VMI agreement, the vendor owns the goods at the customer’s location until 
they are sold, but also manages the ordering on behalf of the customer. As for her associated 
costs, the vendor pays oh  per item stored at the customer, and ao for every order she places 
on his behalf. The customer is then exempt from those expenses. Taking these changes into 
consideration, we now formulate the total costs under a C&VMI agreement for the vendor 
and the customer. Those totals will subsequently be compared to the costs under IS.    
The vendor’s total cost in C&VMI is   
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v ++−+++=                   (4) 
 








aaC ovov ++++′   where C ′ is as explained in 










c εφδγ ++++′=  























Incorporaing the optimal order quantity in (4), we get ccv dhACTC 2213 εφδγ +++′= . 




C φγ ++′ .  Therefore, the vendor’s cost under C&VMI is 
less than her cost of IS if  3vTC  < TCv1 , which reduces to  
                                                   21 εφδγ ++  < 
2
φγ +
                         (5) 
After some algebra, (5) can be written in the form  
                                                 2121 )(])[(4 φγφδεδγ −<++                           (6) 
           The right-hand side of (6) is zero when  φγ = . Therfore, C&VMI would create 
benefits for the vendor if she has, compared to the customer, efficiency or inefficiency either 
in her ordering or inventory holding, but not in both costs. That is, the vendor can make 
better use of the ordering authority created by C&VMI when she has an advantage or 
disadvantage in either her ordering or inventory holding costs. 
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           For example, if the vendor’s ordering cost is too high compared to the customer but 
her inventory holding cost per item is around what the customer pays, then the vendor can 
ship larger quantities to decrease her total ordering cost. This holds true if her inventory 
holding cost is lower but there is not a clear efficiency in her ordering costs, relative to the 
customer. On the other hand, if the vendor’s inventory holding cost is too high, she can 
replenish the customer frequently in small quantities to achieve cost savings. 
          In the meantime, the vendor’s costs associated with C&VMI influence the benefits that 
the agreement can create for her. The vendor’s costs under C&VMI increase linearly in the 
ratios 1δ  and 2ε . Hence, as those parameters they get lower, it is more likely that the vendor 
achieves costs savings, since there is a decrease in the left-hand side of (6).  
          Now, the customer would accept CI plus VMI if his costs under this agreement were 



























         The optimal ordering quantity 3q  was determined by the vendor on behalf of the 
customer. Incorporating that optimal quantity in the customer’s cost function yields    
















δγεεφδcc dhA . 
The customer’s total cost in IS is 1cTC  = ccdhA2 . C&VMI is thus beneficial for the 
customer ( 3cTC < 1cTC ) if  
                                ))((2)())(1( 211121 εφδγδγεεφδ ++<+++−                          (7) 













          Note that )1( 1δ−  and 1ε are both less than one. If the vendor’s replenishment quantity 
3q  is higher than the customer’s replenishment quantity 1q  under IS ( 21 / mm  > 1), it is more 
likely for the customer to achieve cost savings under C&VMI when 1ε  is low. That is to say, 
the customer would not mind large order quantities as long as his physical storage cost per 
item is low.  
         Similarly, the customer can still achieve cost savings when the vendor replenishes him 
very frequently ( 21 / mm  < 1), if his cost per shipment-received is not high. In general, the 
customer is more likely to achieve costs savings under C&VMI because he does not pay the 
opportunity cost of items in stock nor the cost of placing orders. We can now check whether 
both parties can be better off under C&VMI. 
Proposition 3: If  )1()1(2 1221 φδγεεδ −+−> , then C&VMI can create an efficient system. 
Proof: Inequalities (5) and (7) together imply that φγδγεεφδ +<+++− )())(1( 1121 , 
which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for both parties to be better off compared 
to IS. With some algebra, this condition reduces to 122211 2 δεγεεδφδ +>++ , and then to 
)1()1(2 1221 φδγεεδ −+−> .                                                                                                   ■ 
         We see in the proof of Proposition 3 that this necesarry condition (required to achieve 
an efficient system) holds when 1>γ and 1>φ , and also when 1>>γ  or 1>>φ . The latter is 
more likely the case where both parties are better off. This can be explained by our analytical 
results on C&VMI for the vendor and customer.  
         We observed previously that the vendor can make use of the C&VMI agreement to 
offset inefficiency in one of her costs. Depending on which cost parameter is high, the 
vendor can decrease or increase the order quantity to achieve cost savings. That order 
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quantity is also acceptable to the customer, as long as the costs from which he is exempt (cost 
of placing orders and opportunity cost of inventory) compensate his increased costs resulting 
from ordering decisions made by the vendor for him.  
         It may be less likely to achieve an efficient system than a potentially efficient system 
which can be worked out to satisfy both parties. Recall that a system is potentially efficient if 
there are system-wide cost savings. 
























        The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix B. We will use numerical examples 
in the next section to see when C&VMI creates a potentially efficient system. Those 
examples will also highlight the analytical results found in the inventory sourcing and CI 
models considered. We note in passing that the cost sharing argument discussed for CI in 
Sec. 5.2 can also be applied to C&VMI. 
 
4.7 Numerical Examples  
          In this section, we provide figures to contrast IS, CI, and C&VMI numerically when 
certain parameters are varied. In all those examples, cA  = $100 per order, ch =$1.5 per item 
stored, d = 1300 items/year, and p = 1600 items/year. We do not assume any efficiency of the 
vendor over oh  or oa  in case of a CI or C&VMI agreement.  
          Figures 4.4 – 4.6 test the impact of γ  on different sourcing options. In those examples, 
we use the fixed values 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, and φ  = 0.8, while γ  is between (0, 5]. In the 
next three figures, we vary φ  over the interval (0, 5], but set γ  = 1.5, 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1. In 
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Figures 4.10 – 4.12, we change the value of 1ε  over (0, 1) while γ  = 1.5, φ  = 0.8, and 1δ  = 
0.1. In the last two figures,  1δ  varies between (0, 1), γ  = 1.5, φ  = 0.8, and 1ε  = 0.4.    
          In line with our analytical results, we observe in Figure 4.4 that the customer’s cost 
savings under CI is fixed, yet the system-wide and the vendor’s savings increase linearly as 
γ increases. CI is benefical for the vendor when her cost per shipment is at least 3.8 times the 
customer’s cost per order.  System-wides savings can be achieved for lower values of γ .   
          We see in Figure 4.5 that cost savings are possible for the vendor when γ is very low 
or very high. When γ ≤ 0.02, the vendor replenishes the customer frequently to save on 
inventory holding costs. However, the large number of shipments (when γ  is small) 
increases the customer’s and the system-wide total cost compared to IS. On the other hand, 
higher values of γ  enable system-wide cost savings; both parties are better off under 
C&VMI when  γ ≥ 4.0. 





























   Figure 4.4: CI versus IS; 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, and φ  = 0.8; γ  is between (0, 5] 
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  Figure 4.5: C&VMI versus IS; 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, and φ  = 0.8; γ  is between (0, 5] 
 
          When we compare C&VMI to CI for varying values of γ  (Fig. 4.6), we observe that 
C&VMI almost always generates more system-wide savings, although one party may 
sometimes be worse off. (Compared to CI, the vendor is worse off when 2.3 <γ < 4.7, the 
customer is worse off when γ  < 1.6). Then, if a cost-sharing that splits the benefits equally 
can be negotiated, C&VMI is most of the time a better option for both actors. We also see in 
Figure 4.6 that as γ increases, both parties become indifferent between C&VMI and CI 
(relative cost savings are around zero). This is logical: Compared to IS, the customer under 
CI orders larger quantities, and this is what the vendor would do under C&VMI if her 
shipment  costs were high. 
           In Proposition 1, we stated that 2+> φγ  is a necessary condition for the vendor to be 
better off under CI. Therefore, the vendor never achieves cost savings in Figure 4.7, where γ  
= 1.5 and φ  varies between (0, 5]. As φ  increases, the vendor’s total cost increases.   
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  Figure 4.6: C&VMI versus CI; 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, and φ  = 0.8; γ  is between (0, 5] 
 
 



























  Figure 4.7: CI versus IS; 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, γ  = 1.5; φ  is between (0, 5] 
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 Figure 4.8: C&VMI versus IS; 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, γ  = 1.5; φ  is between (0, 5] 
 
         Under a C&VMI agreement, however, it is possible for all parties to achieve cost 
savings when φ  is high enough, namely φ ≥ 3.7 (Figure 4.8). As discussed in the analytical 
formulations, C&VMI becomes an opportunity for the vendor, who is relatively inefficient in 
inventory holding cost ( φ >> γ ), to decrease her carrying costs by sending frequent 
shipments.    
        When we compare C&VMI to CI for varying φ  values (Figure 4.9), we see that 
C&VMI becomes a much better option for the vendor and the whole system as φ  increases. 
This makes sense since the customer under CI increases the order quantity, which in turn 
increases the average system inventory. The vendor, on the other hand, prefers more frequent 
shipments and less inventory when φ  is high, and she can decide so under C&VMI.  
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  Figure 4.9: C&VMI versus CI; 1ε  = 0.4, 1δ  = 0.1, γ  = 1.5; φ  is between (0, 5]     
 
           In line with our analytical results, we see in Figure 4.10 that a change in the value 1ε  
changes all cost savings nonlinearly. As 1ε  aproaches one, the system returns to the costs 
under IS.  While the customer’s savings decrease, the vendor’s as well as system-wide 
savings increase as 11 →ε . We also observe in this example that no 1ε  value creates an 
efficient system; the customer is always better off. The system is potentially efficient when 
1ε  ≥  0.52, but as 1ε  approaches zero, the system-wide and vendor’s costs increase 
enormously. 
        Figure 4.11 compares C&VMI to IS. As 1ε  increases, the vendor’s costs and the 
customer’s savings decrease. An efficient system is never achieved. The vendor does achieve 
cost savings, but only when 1ε  ≥  0.98. (Compare this to CI in Fig. 4.10 where the vendor 
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never achieves cost savings.) System-wide costs in Fig. 4.11 do not change much as 1ε  
varies. 


























   Figure 4.10: CI versus IS; 1δ  = 0.1, φ = 0.8, γ  = 1.5; 1ε  is between (0, 1) 
 



























Figure 4.11: C&VMI versus IS; 1δ  = 0.1, φ = 0.8, γ  = 1.5; 1ε  is between (0, 1) 
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           It can be seen in Figure 4.12 that low values of 1ε  make a big difference for the 
vendor’s and stytem-wide costs under C&VMI when compared to CI. However, CI becomes 
a preferred option for the whole system when 1ε  ≥  0.69, and for the vendor when 0.95 ≥ 1ε  
≥  0.51. Note that the customer favours CI over C&VMI when 0.41 ≥  1ε  . 
          We present only in a single graph (Fig. 4.13) the implication of varying 1δ  values, 
since they do not influence the costs for IS or CI. When we compare C&VMI to IS in Figure 
4.13, we see that the customer’s savings and vendor’s costs under C&VMI are increasing in 
1δ . System-wide savings, on the other hand, do not change much, remaining near zero.  
          The numerical examples we have provided in this section tested the parameters ( 1δ  
being the last) that influence the vendor’s and the customer’s costs in different sourcing 
options. In the next section, we provide a summary in addition to some conclusions. 
 

























Figure 4.12: C&VMI versus CI; 1δ  = 0.1, φ = 0.8, γ  = 1.5; 1ε  is between (0, 1) 
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    Figure 4.13: C&VMI versus IS; 1ε = 0.4, φ = 0.8, γ  = 1.5; 1δ  is between (0, 1) 
          
4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
          In this paper, we studied a case where a customer and vendor initially consider 
consignment inventory for a single item. Comparing it to our base case, which is inventory 
sourcing, we obtained analytical conditions under which CI creates benefits for one or more 
parties. In contrast to the general belief that CI is beneficial only for the customer, we 
showed that it may be favourable for the vendor as well. Depending on the costs of shipment, 
and who pays for transportation, CI can be beneficial for both parties. 
         We showed that if the CI agreement results in a potentially efficient system, it can be 
turned into an efficient one. To achieve that, we found the minimum and the maximum 
amounts to which the wholesale price may increase, such that the customer may accept to 
share his benefits with the vendor. When the system is inefficient under CI, the vendor can 
offer a C&VMI agreement to realize savings for her and for the system.   
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         We considered the option of CI plus VMI and extended our analysis to find the optimal 
costs and saving-potentials under that agreement. We showed the vendor can make use of 
C&VMI to improve her costs in areas in which she is inefficient. Although the customer 
prefers in general CI rather than C&VMI, and the vendor vice versa, we observed that 
C&VMI is more likely to generate system-wide cost savings.  
         This paper provided closed-form analytical results for different sourcing options. We 
showed that the outcome of any of those options depends on the cost parameters of the 
parties involved. We identified conditions under which option one is preferred to another. 
Our findings can help a vendor or a customer decide a priori if CI or C&VMI create benefits 
for them.  
          Future research may evolve in two streams. First, it is possible to study the economies 
of scale created by a C&VMI agreement when there are multiple customers: The vendor, 
whose goal is to achieve flexibility in production and to reduce her operational costs (such as 
shipment expenses), offers C&VMI to some of her customers. In the mean time, the 
customers under that agreement should not be worse off compared to IS.  
         Secondly, a model can be developed for a customer to choose vendors for CI when 
there are multiple suppliers of certain items. CI is always beneficial for the customer without 
any change in the wholesale price. But various suppliers could enforce a price adjustment 
when CI is offered. In that case, the customer should carefully select the CI-vendors to 
maximize her savings. 
         Both of those possible extensions consider multiple customers or vendors. One can 
simulate the resulting models when end-consumer demand is uncertain. In settings where 
demand is more stable, it may be possible to find closed-form solutions.     
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Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 4: Our aim is to see when 3TC < 1TC     
1TC  = 1cTC + 1vTC  = ( )φγ +++′ 2
2
1
cc dhAC  




















dhAC cc εδ  








21 2)1()1( mmmm +−+− εδ   <  )2(21 φγ ++mm . After some 
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5. Analysis of VMI for a Single Vendor and Multiple Customers 





            Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) is a partnership that enables the vendor to order on 
behalf of customers. When coupled with consignment inventory (C&VMI), the vendor also 
owns the goods at the customer’s premises until they are used. In this paper, we study these 
supply chain practices for a vendor and multiple customers who face time-varying, but 
deterministic, external demand for a single product.  
           We develop MIP models for different sourcing options, propose a heuristic for the 
vendor’s model under VMI, and a Lagrangian-relaxation method for her model under 
C&VMI. The two-part heuristic first determines the best set of customers to offer VMI, and 
then solves the remaining problem of integrated production, customer-replenishment and 
transportation through decomposition. For customers, we show that it is in their best interest 
to establish the maximum inventory for vendor-replenishments when VMI or C&VMI are 
options. A model to determine those levels and a solution algorithm are proposed.   
           Our heuristics and the Lagrangian-relaxation approach are tested via numerical 
examples, which reveal that the heuristic for the VMI model performs well. The optimality 
gap resulting from Lagrangian relaxation for the C&VMI model is reasonable in 32 test 
problems.  We also find that C&VMI is a better option than VMI for any customer. The 
vendor, on the other hand, prefers C&VMI over VMI only when it results in a greater 




          A company involved in supply chain operations must accomplish the processes of 
sourcing (procurement of required materials), making (production of goods using the sourced 
materials), and delivering (transportation of those goods to customers). In industry, one of the 
main concerns of every company is to minimize its operational costs while maintaining the 
best possible efficiency.  
          Although part of a supply chain, a firm may still focus on optimizing its own costs. In 
that case, the decisions concerning production, replenishment and transportation are made 
separately and independently by members of that chain. However, a supply chain implies the 
interaction of its members, even when they have different operational goals. In fact, the 
performance of that chain depends not only on how well each member manages its 
operational processes, but also on how well the members coordinate their decisions (Achabal 
et al. 2000).                
           Consider a supply chain composed of a vendor who manufactures product, and 
customers who purchase those goods and deliver them to end consumers. The sourcing plans 
of customers affect the vendor’s manufacturing and delivery decisions. Customers’ decisions 
on the quantity and timing of replenishments may create inflexibility in the vendor’s 
operation, resulting in higher costs for her and the entire supply chain.  
           Industry regards “coordinated decision making” as working together to maximize the 
efficiency of the whole supply chain (Karonis, 1997). With the help of information 
technology, various chain members can collaborate to decrease costs and deliver better value 
to end consumers.  With that common goal in mind, a supply chain becomes a single entity 
that competes with other supply chains, rather than chain members competing with each 
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other (Marshall et al. 1999).  The benefit of coordinated replenishments was estimated to be 
$30 billion in the grocery industry (Kurt Salmon Associates, 1993) and $14 billion in the 
foodservice industry (Troyer, 1996).   
           Such figures have motivated researchers to devise contracts that enable coordination 
within a supply chain. The main idea is to find the optimal actions for chain members who 
need to align their decisions to achieve optimal chain costs. The incentive to apply those 
optimal actions is set by transfer payments. A number of examples in that research area are 
presented by Cachon (2003). 
           Although research in supply chain contracts has been extended to various settings, the 
industry has preferred supply-chain agreements that are more general (better known) and 
practical (easier to understand and implement). Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), one such 
agreement, will be analyzed in this paper for a supply chain containing a single manufacturer 
and its multiple customers.                     
          VMI, a partnership agreement between vendor and customer, allows the vendor decide 
when that customer will be replenished, and in what quantity. VMI enables upstream and 
downstream supply-chain members to coordinate their decisions, while staying independent 
as separate companies. In an ideal VMI partnership, the customer is relieved of the effort and 
cost of placing purchase orders. The vendor, who now can be informed about the point-of-
sale data and the customer’s inventory levels, achieves savings through economies of scale in 
production and transportation. 
           VMI has been in use since the late 1980’s, and has become an alternative sourcing 
option that is easy to understand and relatively easy to implement. Successful applications of 
VMI, including Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble (Waller et al., 1999), Campbell Soup 
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Company (Clark, 1994), Barilla SpA (Hammond, 1994), Intel (Kanellos, 1998) and Shell 
Chemical (Hibbard, 1998) have motivated some other companies to seek cost savings.   
           Through contacting business firms, we observed that VMI does not belong to a single 
type of industry. For example, Parmalat Canada, one of the largest dairy producers in Canada, 
uses VMI with its retailers. Making use of the point of sales data, the company can react 
quicker to changes in the end-consumer demand (which can be quite uncertain), and can 
make better utilization of its fleet and manufacturing facilities.  
          On the other hand, the Automation and Drives section of Siemens AG, which  
produces low-voltage power distributors and industrial controls, uses VMI with some of its 
suppliers under the name Standard Parts Management and for products with fairly certain 
demand. The company saves some costs of replenishment and inventory control, and 
strengthens the ties with its VMI suppliers. The literature also identifies implementation of 
VMI in various sectors. De Toni and Zamalo (2005) and Holmstrom (1998) provide 
examples for household electrical appliances and food in the grocery sector, respectively.    
            However, VMI is not always a success. In addition to some failure-stories 
(Schreibfeder, 1997), there are also claims that vendors are unwillingly forced to a VMI 
agreement by powerful customers (Burke, 1996), and that VMI is only a way to transfer 
inventory risks from customers to vendors (Saccomano, 1997).  The dispute over whether 
VMI is beneficial or not, combined with a shortage of quantitative models, causes hesitation 
for many firms that consider implementing VMI.  
           Why does VMI work for some companies but fail for some others? In an attempt to 
answer this question, Gumus et al. (2006) studied the VMI agreement of a vendor and a 
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customer. Under stationary demand, they identified the general conditions under which VMI 
does or does not succeed.  
           Although VMI is an agreement between one vendor and a single customer, it is natural 
that the supplier can offer VMI to a number of its customers. While the outcome of such a 
decision may not make a big difference for the customers, the vendor may save more through 
economies of scale. In this paper, we will study a system consisting of a single vendor and 
multiple customers, under time-varying but deterministic demand. The vendor, who has the 
choice to offer VMI to one or more of her customers, should determine the right set of 
customers to minimize her total operational costs resulting from production, replenishment of 
customers, and transportation.  
          When VMI is coupled with Consignment Inventory (C&VMI), the consequent 
agreement forces the vendor, in addition to arranging replenishments on behalf of the 
customer, to own the goods replenished until they are used by that customer. In Section 6, we 
will look at the C&VMI agreement as an alternative to VMI.  
           In the traditional way of doing business (which we will call Inventory Sourcing (IS) 
throughout), the customers order from the vendor, and all parties make decisions separately. 
We will assume that IS is our base case, and will use the vendor’s and the customers’ costs 
under it as a benchmark to compare them with the costs under VMI and C&VMI. It is natural 
that, before any such agreement can be accepted by a customer or the vendor, it must create a 
lower total cost compared to the base case.     
          There are two distinct, yet interrelated sets of decisions the vendor has to make when 
VMI or C&VMI is an option. First, to which of its customer should the vendor offer an 
agreement? Since she incurs a cost associated with each and every agreement, the vendor 
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should select the right customers and the proper number of agreements. Those decisions 
should ensure that the vendor, as well as each customer, should have total costs no worse 
than respective costs under IS. (Throughout this paper, the term “worse off” refers to a 
“strictly less than” condition, whereas the term “better off” means “strictly greater than”).   
          But this then depends on the second set of decisions: the choices that the vendor makes 
for her operational processes, namely production, customer replenishment, and transportation. 
When the vendor offers to make replenishments on behalf of a customer, that customer’s 
main concern should be to evaluate the implications of accepting the agreement. Rationale is 
that the customer wants to maintain his total cost not higher than what it is under IS.    
           To classify the topic of this paper, it lies within that area of VMI research containing 
studies that consider the coordination aspect of VMI or the operational benefits it creates. We 
use Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) models for the cases we consider, and devise 
algorithms and heuristics for the vendor and the customer for their operational decisions in a 
multi-period setting. Hence, in terms of formulation, our study can be considered to be in the 
multi-echelon dynamic lot-sizing research area.   
           The literature includes a number of publications on VMI coordination.Cachon (2001) 
investigates whether VMI can coordinate the supply chain of a single supplier and multiple 
retailers. He concludes that both the vendor and retailers must also agree to make fixed 
transfer payments in addition to VMI, and must be willing to share the benefits.  Bernstein 
and Federgruen (2003) show that channel coordination can be achieved under VMI, when 
there is a constant-demand-rate and a single retailer retains the decision rights on pricing and 
sales target.  
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           Aviv and Federgruen (1998) assume a VMI agreement that leads to a fully centralized 
planning model where the vendor minimizes the system-wide costs. They find that 
information sharing in conjunction with VMI is always more beneficial than information 
sharing alone. Aside from that, Cachon and Fisher (2000) and Lee et al. (2000) look at how a 
supplier can use customer-demand information for better sales forecasting and inventory 
control. These models show significant direct and indirect benefits to the supplier, yet no 
direct benefits to the retailers.    
            In our models, the vendor has the choice to implement VMI with a subset of its 
customers, which is new in the VMI literature. We don’t consider pricing, nor central 
decision making in our paper. While the vendor optimizes her operational costs based on the 
right set of VMI decisions, the customers ensure (by means of adding a constraint to the 
vendor’s model, which will be discussed in the next sections) that their costs do not go up 
under VMI. As in industry, we assume that VMI is a better choice than IS if none of the 
parties involved is worse off.    
            In addition to the impacts of VMI on channel coordination, VMI has also previously 
been examined in the context of operational benefits that it may create for the vendor. 
Research in this category focuses on benefits offered by the flexibility that VMI enables, 
mainly in delivery. Examples include combining routes from multiple origins and 
consolidating shipments to two or more customers.  
            Campbell et al. (1998) and Kleywegt et al. (2000) analyze a stochastic inventory-
routing problem by a Markov decision process. Both investigate the benefits of allowing the 
supplier to construct better delivery routes for multiple retailers. Cheung and Lee (2002) 
compare two information-based supply-chain efforts: Knowledge of retailers’ inventory 
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position to coordinate and achieve truck load-shipments, and use of that same information to 
balance retailers’ stocking positions.  
             In a similar vein, Cetinkaya and Lee (2000) analyze how a vendor under VMI can 
synchronize inventory and transportation decisions. They assume that the vendor under VMI 
can hold orders until a suitable dispatch time, at which orders can be economically 
consolidated. Chaouch (2001) aims at finding the vendor’s shipment rate under VMI, 
provided that the vendor can change shipment frequencies to balance shortage cost.  
            Previous studies related to the operational benefits of VMI assume that VMI is 
already implemented, and focus on the vendor’s cost savings when she has control over the 
customers. The impacts of VMI on the customers are not considered. Moreover, those studies 
do not address the question of whether VMI should be in use at all. In our paper, we 
determine if VMI is a better option than IS for supply chain members, and optimize the 
operational costs of the vendor when there are VMI and non-VMI customers. We evaluate 
the impacts of an agreement and the operational decisions on all parties involved.  
            As opposed to what may be assumed in some publications (e.g. Bernstein and 
Federgruen 2003, or Shah and Goh, 2006), we remark that VMI and C&VMI are different 
agreements with distinct impacts on the vendor and customers. Thus, we will treat these two 
agreements in separate models. Some parts of those models and formulations therein have 
roots in Dynamic Lot Sizing (DLS), the second part of our literature survey.    
          DLS is one of the fields in Production and Operations Management in which there is 
considerable volume of publications. An overview of a number of those papers is contained 
in Drexl and Kimms (1997) and in Erenguc et al. (1999). Here, we will give examples of 
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papers related to uncapacitated and capacitated models that motivate, in one way or another, 
some of the formulations in our models. 
          The Uncapacitated Lot Sizing Problem (ULSP) deals with a sole decision maker who 
optimizes the replenishment of a single product under unlimited supply. Wagner and Within 
(1958) present a dynamic programming algorithm for the solution of ULPS. Examples of 
extensions to this algorithm (for efficient implementation) include Federgruen and Tzur 
(1991) and Aggarwal and Park (1993). The stochastic version of the problem was also 
considered by several authors (e.g. Bookbinder and Tan, 1988). 
            The Capacitated Lot Sizing Problem (CLSP) considers factors, such as labor and 
equipment, that can limit production. Florian et al. (1980) show that CLSP is NP-hard, which 
indicates the computational complexity of the problem. Therefore, special cases of CLSP 
were addressed and solved by researchers. Examples of such are Baker et al. (1978), Erenguc 
and Aksoy (1990), Shaw and Wagelmans (1998), and Sox and Gao (1999). Gopalakrishnan 
et al. (2001) provide a more general form of the problem by considering carryover of setups 
into adjacent periods.                
           We do not consider any production capacity, but there may be a replenishment 
capacity specified by a customer, when the vendor manages his inventory. We will evaluate 
the implications of customer-specified restrictions in our models.  
           The lot-sizing literature deals mainly with production and inventory management, 
without considering the transportation aspect explicitly (Diaby and Martel, 1993). 
Coordinated production and distribution within DLS, on the other hand, extends the 
traditional lot sizing models to see the tradeoffs between production and transportation 
decisions. Examples include Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) who study inventory routing, and 
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Cohen and Lee (1988) who analyze cost implications of inventory distribution in a supply 
chain (but do not consider the impacts on physical distribution).  
          In addition to those, Chandra and Fisher (1994), in research which may be the most 
related to some parts of our paper, investigate the value of coordinated production and 
distribution.  They model the production and delivery options of a manufacturer who must 
satisfy external demand over a finite horizon, and who has her own fleet. In their 
computational study, they solve the production and transportation problems separately. They 
conclude that the value of coordinating production and distribution can be high under the 
“right” conditions.  
          In our models, we consider not only the production and distribution decisions, but also 
the question of which customers to offer VMI/C&VMI, and replenishment to them under 
those agreements. Moreover, instead of private carrier, the transportation portion of our 
models assume “common carrier,” a for-hire outside trucking company. (That case is more 
typical in industry than is transport in a manufacturer’s own truck.) Finally, we evaluate 
additional heuristics to solve our VMI model.  
          Most of the literature mentioned on ULSP and CLSP looks at a single firm that 
optimizes its operations over a planning horizon. When multiple echelons are considered, the 
research focuses on joint optimal lot sizing, but for an infinite horizon. According to the flow 
of materials from the origins to destinations in a production facility or a supply chain, the 
problems in this area are categorized as serial, assembly, distribution or general system.  
         Common to all those problems is a central decision maker who optimizes the system-
wide costs, mostly using the concept of echelon inventory. A good number of examples and 
references in this are provided by Axsater (2003). Since a central decision maker is assumed, 
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full knowledge of cost parameters of all parties is also assumed to be available to the decision 
maker. In VMI or C&VMI, however, only the demand information, not the cost parameters, 
is shared. Moreover, the companies involved remain independent. 
         It can be difficult to find a solution to the multi-echelon lot sizing problem even when 
the demand is stationary. The dynamic version of the problem is even more difficult, making 
heuristic approaches the only way to deal with them. The reader is referred to Silver, Pyke 
and Peterson (1998), Zipkin (2000) and the references therein for heuristic approaches to 
multi-echelon dynamic and joint lot sizing problems (MDLSP).   
          Our formulations for VMI and for C&VMI differ from MDLSP because of the 
decisions we need to make. Hence, to find solutions, our models require an alternative 
treatment that considers special structures in the formulations. Although the underlying idea 
of our VMI or C&VMI models is the same as in other references mentioned in the literature 
survey, there is no single paper to which we can truly compare our work. The next section 
will highlight the problem characteristics that we take into account, and describe the steps we 
take for our formulations and solution approaches.   
              
5.2 Problem Definition and Research Scope 
         We consider a supply chain in which a single vendor produces a unique item and 
satisfies multiple customers. End-consumer demand is different for each customer; it is time-
varying but known, and realized only at the customers. We assume a planning horizon with 
12 periods. Customers are independent; each must meet the demand of its end-consumers, 
and the vendor must meet the replenishment orders coming from her customers. 
          In the traditional way of doing business (IS), each customer orders from the vendor 
based on his costs of inventory holding and ordering. That ordering cost includes the costs of 
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replenishment-decision making and of shipment receipt. Orders are placed at the beginning 
of a period and received immediately (i.e., lead time is assumed zero). No backlogging is 
allowed. In every period, each customer has the choice of ordering from the vendor, or 
satisfying his demand from stock. Inventory holding costs are incurred for stocks on hand at 
the end of any period.  
          Under IS, the vendor has to fulfill the orders specified by her customers. We assume 
that the vendor’s production capacity exceeds total demand in any period. Customer orders 
are shipped at the beginning of periods, and inventory holding cost is charged at the end of 
each period for the items on hand. We assume that production-lead time is zero, and in any 
period the vendor can decide to produce, or to satisfy an order from her stock. The vendor’s 
production cost and sales price per item are fixed, and hence will be omitted in our models 
(recall that all demand must be met). In addition to the inventory holding cost, the vendor 
pays a production setup cost each time she initiates manufacturing; incurs a cost per shipment 
released to one or more customers; and transportation costs. 
           To evaluate the impacts of VMI on shipment consolidation, we assume that the 
transportation cost is paid by the vendor. (That is, a vendor in control of the timing and 
quantity of shipments can combine the small orders of different customers to achieve 
economies of scale in transportation, if the transportation cost is paid by her).  We further 
assume that the vendor engages the transportation services of a common carrier, i.e. a public, 
for-hire trucking company.  
           That carrier, taking into account an all-units discount scheme, offers a piece-wise 
linear freight rate as a function of the total weight in a given shipment. At the end of a period, 
a vehicle dispatched from the vendor may carry an amount b of goods to be dropped to a total 
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of i customers. The carrier then charges the vendor a fixed cost for every stop the truck 
makes.  
           In the piece-wise linear freight rate structure, there is a variable cost per unit 
transported, and a fixed cost per segment, for every linear segment separated by breakpoints. 
Total quantity transported can only be in one segment. The reader is referred to Balakrishnan 
and Graves (1989) for a more detailed discussion of this cost structure, and to Higginson 
(1993) and Croxton et al. (2003) for formulations and discussions of various transportation 
cost structures. The fixed cost per stop at a customer is charged independent of the sequence 
of stops (e.g., if a shipment released from the vendor includes consolidated orders of two 
customers, then there are two stops and two fixed charges). We do not consider shipment 
routing in this paper.  
           Under IS, each customer has his own ordering plan, and replenishes separately from 
the vendor. That plan depends on inventory holding charges and ordering costs. Once all 
customers determine their replenishment policies over the planning horizon, the vendor 
collects them to plan her production. Note that the vendor is aware of the customers’ ordering 
plans, but not the actual end-consumer demand. 
          When the customers make decisions regarding the timing and quantity of 
replenishments, it is difficult for the vendor (who must meet the customers’ requirements) to 
seek economies of scale in her operations. The vendor may prefer alternative replenishment 
quantities and/or different ordering times than the customers specify. That is, their decisions 
may act as constraints against the vendor’s   flexibility which she requires to decrease her 
production, inventory and transportation costs.    
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           A VMI agreement between a vendor and customer gives her that flexibility, but at a 
cost. Under VMI, the vendor makes replenishment decisions on behalf of the customer, and 
pays the cost of replenishment decision-making. The agreement also provides the vendor 
with data on the end-consumer demand.  
          VMI is a tactical decision, yet its success depends on potential savings in operational 
activities. Whether to choose VMI or to stay in IS requires a thorough evaluation of 
operational costs. The total costs in each case must be compared. Those costs for the vendor, 
either fixed or variable, relate to production, replenishment and transportation. The customer 
pays a fixed amount for every shipment received, and a variable cost per item he stores in 
stock. 
            Note that when there are n 2≥  customers, the vendor may choose to implement VMI 
with fewer than n. By a “VMI-customer”, we shall mean one who implements VMI with the 
vendor. VMI-customers are relieved of paying expenses associated with making 
replenishments. Although this may not guarantee them lower costs compared to IS, no 
customer would implement VMI unless he is no worse off. Under VMI, the vendor may wish 
to send large quantities to achieve economies of scale in transportation. Then, should the 
customer accept any quantity determined by the vendor, or should he set some limits to it? A 
customer that is offered VMI must answer this question, before accepting the agreement, so 
his costs do not go up.  
           The vendor, on the other hand, is concerned first with the right set of customers to 
offer VMI. Before implementing the agreement, the vendor must foresee the savings it can 
create in production, replenishment and transportation. The vendor, too, would not wish to 
undertake any VMI agreements that create no cost savings. 
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           When Consignment Inventory is coupled with Vendor Managed Inventory (C&VMI), 
the vendor now owns the stock at a C&VMI-customer’s premises until the items are used. 
Hence, the vendor pays the opportunity cost of those goods. In this case, even when there is 
no restriction specified by the customer, it may be in the vendor’s best interest not to send 
large quantities. As in VMI, both the vendor and customer would want to get the best from 
this agreement. Therefore, either party will cast aside implementing C&VMI if the agreement 
increases their total costs compared to IS.   
           As we emphasized in the previous discussions, IS is our base case to which we 
compare VMI and C&VMI. Although we will contrast the outcomes of these two 
agreements, choosing to implement any agreement is based on comparison of total costs 
under that agreement vs IS. Values of decision variables and total costs of the vendor and 
customers in each case will be determined using Mixed Integer Programming.  We will 
describe the notation used in those models in Section 3. Numerical examples will be 
provided in Section 7, and a summary and conclusions in Section 8. Sections 4-6 will cover 
various models and solution algorithms, which we briefly describe here.   
           In Section 4 (IS), each customer decides on replenishments first based on his 
minimum total costs. A customer’s cost stems from replenishment decision-making, 
shipment-received, physical storage and opportunity cost of inventory. The vendor receives 
the order quantities from each customer, and optimizes her operations based on her costs of 
production setup, inventory holding and transportation. Under IS, the customers’ optimal 
replenishment decisions are input to the vendor’s model.  
           In Section 5 (VMI), it is the vendor who makes replenishment orders on behalf of 
customers. Hence, there is only one model that determines the production, customer-
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replenishment, and transportation quantities and timing. The vendor pays a cost for each 
decision made to replenish, which is assumed to be the same as what the customer pays in IS. 
We propose a heuristic to solve the vendor’s model. In the first part of that heuristic, VMI 
decisions (which concern the right set of customers with whom to implement VMI) are 
separated from the model. In the second part, we propose three decomposition methods to 
solve the remaining problem of integrated production, replenishment and transportation. 
Those methods generate two or more sub-problems which are solved hierarchically.  
          We also determine whether a customer should set a maximum-inventory level that the 
vendor can keep at his premises. In case he should, we propose a model that decides the 
optimal level of stock that can be allowed by each and every customer, and provide a 
solution algorithm.  
            In Section 6(C&VMI), the vendor determines each customer’s replenishment 
quantity as in Section 5, but now pays (in addition to the cost of replenishment decision 
making), the opportunity cost of goods stored at the customers’ locations. Hence, there is still 
one model to find optimal production, replenishment and transportation quantities, and 
timing. Of course, the vendor should also identify the best set of C&VMI-customers. The 
vendor’s model is solved using Lagrangian relaxation: By relaxing one set of constraints in 
the model, we decompose it into two sub-problems, each are easier to solve. To determine 
the Lagrange multipliers, we use the cutting-plane approach of Kelly (1960).    
            In all our models, we assume that at time zero, there is no inventory anywhere in the 
supply chain. Also, closing inventory at the end of the planning horizon is zero. We further 
assume that when VMI is an option for a vendor and customer, the end-consumer demand of 
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that customer is passed to the vendor. The idea is to give the vendor a fair chance to evaluate 
the cost impacts of the agreement before implementing it.  
            We will next define the model indices, parameters, and variables used throughout this 
paper.  Note that for all of our parameters and variables, any subscript will be an index 
relating to a customer, time period, or segment of the freight-discount scheme (See Sec. 3). 
Superscripts are used to differentiate which party owns that parameter or variable: If a 
parameter/variable’s superscript starts with a “v”, then it belongs to the vendor, whereas a 
“c” means it is the customer’s. Similarly, the notation V and Ci  used in the text refer to the 
vendor and customer i respectively.  
 
5.3 Notation 
         Let us now “name” the models we will develop and use. (In what follows, it should be 
recalled that each customer’s replenishment under VMI or C&VMI is determined by the 
vendor. Hence, there is no replenishment model for customers under those cases.) 
       IS- iC  and IS-V:    Ci’s and the V’s models for IS respectively. 
       VMI-V and CVMI-V:    V’s model for VMI and C&VMI respectively.  
       Imax iC -VMI and Imax iC -CVMI:    Ci’s model for his maximum inventory level  
             under VMI and C&VMI respectively.  
          
        To keep the notation compact and easy to follow, we provide a single notation for each 
of the decision variables of the customers and the vendor, although it may be used in multiple 
models. To compare and contrast decision variables in two or more models, we will use the 
models’ names as identifiers (e.g. the vendor’s production quantities in VMI-V and CVMI-V). 
 Indices 
i = 1, ..., I  (customers)  
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t = 1, ..., T  (time period) 
s = 1, ..., S  (particular quantity segment for transportation) 
  
Parameters 
itd : end-consumer demand at iC  in period t 
cs
ia : cost per shipment received, paid by customer iC  
co




ia : cost per ordering decision made on behalf of iC , paid by the vendor, V 
v
a :  V’s cost per shipment released 
v
S : V’s cost per production setup  
c
ih : iC ’s cost per inventory, charged at the end of periods. 
c




ih   where 
                csih : physical storage cost of an item in stock       
                coih : opportunity cost of an item in stock  
v
h : V’s cost per unit held in inventory, charged at the end of periods 
MaxVMIc
itI : maximum level of stock allowed by iC  in period t under VMI 
MaxCVMIc
itI : maximum level of stock allowed by iC  in period t under C&VMI  
sc : cost per item transported 
sf : fixed cost of transportation (fixed cost per dispatch from the vendor’s facility) 
if : fixed cost per stop at iC  during transportation  
1M , 2M , 3M : “big numbers” used in MIP formulation 








itdM 2 , 3M = 12 
 
Continuous Decision Variables 
 
v
tQ : the vendor’s production quantity in period t 
c
itq : quantity ordered by iC  in period t 
v
itq : quantity ordered by V on behalf of iC  in period t 
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c
itI : Inventory level of iC  at the end of period t, decided by iC  
vc
itI : Inventory level of iC  at the end of period t, determined by V on behalf of iC  
v
tI : Inventory level of V at the end of period t 
   
0 – 1 Variables 
v
iα : equals 1 if there is a VMI agreement between V and iC , 0 otherwise  
c
ity : equals 1 if iC  orders in period t, 0 otherwise  
vc
ity : equals 1 if V orders on behalf of iC  in period t (requires 
v
iα =1), 0 otherwise 
v
ty : equals 1 if V produces in period t, 0 otherwise 





iISTC _  and 
v
ISTC : iC ’s and V ’s total cost under IS 
c
iVMITC _  and 
v
VMITC  : iC ’s and V ’s total cost under VMI 
c
iCVMITC _  and 
v
CVMITC : iC ’s and V ’s total cost under C&VMI 
 
         Note that we will adopt a superscript “*” at several occasions. When used, it refers to 
the optimal value of a decision variable, which will then serve as a parameter. Having 
described the notation, we can now proceed to formulate the several MIP models. Let us 
begin with the first case, that of Inventory Sourcing.     
 
5.4 Inventory Sourcing (IS) 
         Under IS, each and every customer separately minimizes his total cost of ordering and 
inventory holding over the planning horizon, and orders individually from the vendor. The 
resulting formulation is as follows.  
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Model IS-Ci: For every i, i = 1, ..., I, 
 
























it dqII −+= −1                t∀                                                        (1.3) 
0'0' =
c
iI                                                                                       (1.4)  




itI   0≥        t∀                                                 (1.5) 
 















i Ih ). Constraint (1.2) 
is a forcing constraint, and ensures that the quantity ordered is zero if there is no order 
placed. The equality (1.3) is the demand balance, determining the inventory on hand at the 
end of each period after satisfying that period’s demand. At the beginning of the planning 
horizon, each customer has zero inventory (1.4). Constraint (1.5) shows the types of 
variables. Variable city  equals one if customer i orders from the vendor in period t. 
          IS-Ci is a dynamic economic order quantity model, and was solved by Wagner and 
Within (1958). They developed a deterministic dynamic programming algorithm (now 
known as the Wagner-Within algorithm), which solves the problem for a finite planning 
horizon. It guarantees an optimal selection of replenishment quantities.   




*  become inputs for the vendor, who incorporates them in his model. Let us now formulate 
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ststs xyb ≤−1                         ts,∀                                                                (1.10) 
stsst ybx ≤                           ts,∀                                                                (1.11) 
1≤∑
∈Ss
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000 ==
v
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tst xIQyy     ts,∀                                                     (1.14) 
 













v ySIh ), and 








xcyfyf * , where the first part denotes the fixed cost 
per stop during transportation). Constraints (1.7) and (1.8) are similar to (1.2) and (1.3) 
respectively: (1.7) is a forcing constraint for production, whereas (1.8) is the demand balance 
constraint. Constraint set [1.9, 1.12] is for transportation: (1.9) equates, for every period, the 
total quantity ordered to total quantity transported. (1.10) and (1.11) identify the quantity 
segments for LTL pricing. Constraint (1.12) states that the quantity transported can only be in 
one segment. Equalities in (1.13) set the starting conditions for the first quantity segment of 
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transportation, and for the vendor’s opening inventory at time zero. Finally, (1.14) specifies 
the types of variables used in the model.  
          Note that the customers’ decisions citq
* and city
* are parameters in IS-V. Therefore, 




* . As a result, 
constraints (1.9) to (1.12) do not influence the vendor decisions, hence shipment-release 
costs and transportation costs serve as constants in the objective function.  
          The vendor’s problem then reduces to finding when and how much to produce, so that 
her total cost of inventory holding and production setup is minimized. That is to say, the 
vendor’s problem under IS is also a dynamic economic order quantity model, and can be 
solved by the Wagner-Whitin algorithm.  




*  in any period t is the 
demand that the vendor faces. Yet, the vendor is not aware of the actual demand realized at 
customers. It is the customers who decide the timing and quantity of orders (and hence 
shipments, since no backlogging is allowed). Therefore, inventory sourcing reduces the 
vendor’s flexibility in production, and can eliminate potential savings in transportation.   
          In an attempt to decrease her costs, the vendor can offer VMI to one or more 
customers. In the next section, we will develop models that can help her decide to whom 




5.5 Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) 
           A VMI agreement allows the vendor decide replenishment quantities on behalf of a 
customer. Through VMI, the vendor acquires information regarding the customer’s actual 
demand, and satisfies that demand while considering possible savings for herself.  
          This agreement between the vendor and customer entails the payment by V of a new 
cost associated with the ordering decision. But for C, VMI eliminates the effort (and hence 
costs) of making replenishments. 
          VMI is not a requirement, but rather an option that can replace IS. When there are 
multiple customers, the vendor has a choice, to implement VMI for a subset of her 
customers. The key concern for V is the right set of agreements that minimize her total costs. 
From a VMI-customer’s point of view, however, VMI is not favorable if his total cost is 
lower under IS. 
          There are various questions for the vendor when VMI is an option. The major one 
concerns the right choice of customers with whom to implement VMI. Decisions on 
production setup, replenishments on behalf of VMI-customers and transportation are the 
others. Note that decisions for VMI-customers are made by the vendor, hence those 
customers do not require an optimization model. Their total costs will be calculated based on 
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Subject to  
































































*α                           t∀                                               (2.8)                 
 
ststs xyb ≤−1                                                      ts,∀                                            (2.9) 
 










IIb                                                                                               (2.12) 
 














tst xIIQqyyy α                                               (2.13) 
 
          There are many similarities in this model with IS-V, which includes fewer cost 
parameters, decision variables, and constraints. The vendor’s objective is to minimize the 
total of the following costs in (2.1): cost of making replenishment decisions (first term), 
inventory holding and production setup (second), shipment release (third term), and 
transportation costs (last two terms). 
           Constraints (2.2) and (2.3) are forcing constraints for production-setup and customer-
replenishment respectively. Inequality (2.4) ensures that the vendor can replenish only the 
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VMI-customers. Equations (2.5) and (2.6) are the demand-balance constraints for the vendor 
and customers respectively. We remark that (2.6) covers the VMI-customers only: If viα  is 
zero for iC , then 
v
itq = 0; if not, V determines the replenishment quantity for customer i. Any 
customer’s inventory level under VMI cannot exceed the maximum stock level specified by 
that customer (2.7). Constraints (2.8) to (2.11) concern transportation, as explained in IS-V. 
Inventories are set to zero at the beginning and end of the planning horizon, in (2.12). Types 
of the variables in the model are defined in (2.13).     
        In Model VMI-V, the vendor determines the VMI-customers’ replenishment quantities 
and their timing ( vcity
* ), as well as the amount of inventory these customers carry in each and 
every period ( vcitI
* ). Therefore, iC  has a total cost   
c
















_ .    
         Before we move on to solve the model VMI-V, let us investigate whether customer i 
should set any MaxVMIcitI  level and enforce constraint (2.7) on the vendor when VMI is an 
option. Let us denote by Imax the level of maximum inventory for the vendor’s 
replenishments. We state the following lemma: 








'1..' , the vendor 
implements VMI with him as long as coia  < 2(
v
i af + ). 
 
We provide two lemmas to prove Proposition 1. 










ity 1 are optimal for the vendor who does not pay inventory holding 
cost of goods that she replenishes on behalf of that customer. Intuitively, because the vendor 
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is not concerned about the customer’s inventory carrying cost, she would want to satisfy that 
customer’s total demand all at once in the first period to minimize her costs related to 
ordering, shipment release, and transportation. Note that the vendor would ship the total 
quantity produced to the customer, and would keep no inventory herself.  








'1..' , it is 
definite that the vendor is better off, and the customer is worse off, if coia  < 2(
v
i af + ). 
 








'1..' , then 
c
ity
* >1, which means that the vendor pays at least 2( vi af + ) 
under IS, whereas she pays only  ( vi af + ) under VMI (see Lemma 1).     Intuitively, the 
customer in IS would have multiple orders since he tries to balance inventory holding costs 
with his ordering costs. In VMI, the vendor replenishes the customer all at once in period 
one. Note that compared to IS, the vendor is better off, not only because of the fixed costs of 
transportation and shipment release, but also due to economies of scale in production and 
transportation. (That is, the vendor would have fewer production setups and larger quantities 
shipped to the customer). Therefore, the vendor may achieve cost savings even if  coia  is not 
less than 2( vi af + ). Then, 
co
ia  < 2(
v
i af + ) is a sufficient condition.  
        The two preceding proofs, together, prove Proposition 1, and lay out the importance of 
MaxVMIc
itI  from a customer’s point of view. In case of VMI, every customer’s major concern 
must be to establish maximum levels of inventory for each period in the planning horizon.   
         The easiest way to set Imax levels is to designate a fraction of the customer’s demand 
in any period t (say 20% of itd ). However, this does not guarantee benefits for the customer: 
If MaxVMIcitI  is too low, the vendor may not implement VMI with him in the first place. If it is 
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too high, the customer’s inventory holding costs under VMI may be excessive. Therefore, 
each and every customer should determine the appropriate Imax level that guarantees at least 
indifference, if not reduction, in his total cost under VMI compared to IS. We propose the 
following model to find the values of MaxVMIcitI . 
 








































i II                                   i∀                                         (2.18)  
MaxVMIc
itI  = 
c
itI                                                                               (2.19) 




itI   0≥        ti,∀                                                       (2.20) 
 
        In this model, each customer maximizes his inventory holding cost (equation 2.14), 
provided that his total cost of shipments-received and inventory holding must be less than or 
equal to his total cost in IS-Ci (constraint 2.17), and that his starting and ending inventories 
are zero (constraints 2.18). Note that the left hand side of (2.17) excludes coia , cost of making 
a replenishment decision, which is now paid by the vendor under VMI. Constraints (2.15)-
(2.16), and (2.20) are as explained for constraints (1.2)-(1.3), and (1.5) in IS-Ci.  
Proposition 2: The customer is never worse off under VMI, if he allows a maximum 
inventory level of MaxVMIcitI
*  
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Proof: Let n and n' be the total number of orders in the optimal solutions of ImaxCi -VMI  
and IS-Ci respectively. Then, n is always less than or equal to n'. Under VMI, the vendor 
cannot send fewer than n orders because of feasibility required by MaxVMIcitI
* . She would not 
send n' or more orders, but would rather prefer remaining under IS. 
          To maximize the total inventory over the planning horizon, a customer must minimize 
the number of orders while satisfying all demand, without backlogging. Meanwhile, his total 




_ . Note that “lot-for-lot” ordering is the worst 




itI .  
          Let n be the number of demand periods. In the least-favorable case, lot-for-lot 
ordering, we would need n orders to meet total demand. We then start with the first period of 
demand to see if the order size at that time can be increased to cover requirements upcoming 
periods, provided that total cost does not exceed c iISTC
*
_ .  
        Once we find the order quantity in that period, we then proceed to the successive period 
where we will need to order again. Every time we must order, we determine the maximum 
upcoming demand that can be covered with a single replenishment, satisfying the constraint 
(2.17) that we have enough budget to achieve lot-for-lot ordering for the demand remaining.    




_ , the algorithm will increase the total cost of 
ordering and inventory holding to the point where it equals c iISTC
*
_ . Otherwise, the algorithm 




_ . We now 
provide details of the algorithm. 
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Algorithm ImaxCi -VMI 
Initiate the algorithm: Start with the first period t' in which demand is non-zero. Define  t'' = 
t'+1, and k = 1. Define and initiate Surplusi = n
cs
ia ,  Slacki = 0. 
Step 1: Check the demand of next period:   
             If "itd = 0, t'' = t'' +1, go to Step 1 
             If not, go to next step 
Step 2: Define Costi = (n- k) 
cs




















_  , go to Step 3 
                          Else go to Step 4 





                          If c iISTC
*
_ < Costi < Surplusi  
                                  Set Surplusi = Costi, go to Step 3  




_   
                                 Set Slacki = Costi , go to Step 3 
                          Else, go to Step 4 






itd ;   t'' = t'' +1, k = k +1   
                           If t'' = 12, set number of orders = n- k, go to Step 5 
                           Else go to Step 1          
Step 4:  t' = t'', t'' = t' +1 
                           If t' =12, stop, set number of orders = n- k 
                           Else go to Step 1  
Step 5: Define residual_cost = c iISTC
*
_  - (n - k)
cs









i Ih  
            Define residual_inventory = (residual_cost) / cih  
            For every successive order, let t' be the period of placing an order that covers   
            demand until period t''. Select the minimum of (t'- t'')’s. Add  
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            (residual_inventory) / ( t' - t'') to the inventory levels of periods [t', t''-1]. STOP.  
 
This algorithm gives the minimum number of orders, and the optimal amount of total 
inventory, for customer i over the planning horizon. We can now return to solution of the 
Model VMI-V. 
 
Solution to VMI-V 
         The problem VMI-V is complicated by the interrelated decisions of production, 
customer-replenishment and transportation, and of course with whom to implement VMI. 
First of all, the vendor has 2I-1 choices of VMI agreements with I customers. (Note that the 
case of “No VMI agreements” is excluded). Assume for a moment that those choices are 
given in advance to the vendor. Her remaining problem is still difficult: the vendor’s 
production and replenishment choices not only depend on the relevant costs, but also on how 
much the vendor can ship to customers. 
          Although it seems that V would take advantage of the maximum inventory levels of 
customers, shipping as much as possible in any period, that may not be optimal because of 
possible economies of scale in transportation in future periods. This means, for that specific 
period, the vendor can utilize only that fraction of MaxVMIcitI
*  which optimizes the cost of 
shipment dispatch and transportation in that period plus the periods thereafter.        
         We therefore provide a heuristic to solve the VMI-V model. Note that the vendor must 
make four sets of decisions. The first is the right set of VMI-customers, identified with 
optimal values of viα . If we knew the correct set of VMI-customers in advance, then we could 
run the model VMI-V once instead of evaluating all 2I-1 VMI options. Hence, the first part of 
our heuristic starts by identifying those customers best for VMI implementation.  
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         The remaining decisions are related to production (P), replenishment (R), and 
transportation (T). Although these are interrelated, we can decompose them into sub-
problems that are easier to solve. The tradeoff of doing so is the optimality gap. The more we 
decompose, the less time it takes to solve, yet the solution quality worsens. In the second part 
of our heuristic, we solve P, R, and T problems in four different ways. In order of increasing 
complexity, they are: 
Method 1 (P-R-T): Solve P, R, and T separately [decompose by constraints (2.5) and (2.8)]  
Method 2 (P-RT): Solve P separately; R and T together [decompose by constraint (2.5)] 
Method 3 (PR-T): Solve P and R together; T separately [decompose by constraint (2.8)] 
Method 4 (PRT): Solve P, R, and T together (no decomposition) 
 
          Solutions to sub-problems are obtained in a hierarchical order: P decisions comes first, 
R decisions next, and T decisions last. (This hierarchy applies, whatever the decomposition 
scheme.) We can now provide the details of our heuristic.  
 
Heuristic for VMI – Part 1 
 
          Assume for the moment that there is only one customer, customer i, to serve. There are 
two options for the vendor: a VMI agreement or not. Calculate the vendor’s total cost for 
each of those options. The total cost of no VMI is vISTC , which is obtained from IS-V. Total 
cost of VMI ( vVMITC ) is determined by solving P, R, and T together in VMI-V where now 
v
iα =1 for that specific customer i. If 
v
VMITC  < 
v
ISTC , set Ci as a VMI-customer. If not, set 
v









Heuristic for VMI – Part 2 
 
Method 1: P-R-T  
Solve P, R, and T separately [decompose by constraint sets (2.5) and (2.8)].  
Problem P: Determine the production periods and quantities based on actual demands of the 
VMI-customers and the order quantities of non-VMI customers: 








v ySIh   
























1 αα           t∀                          (P2.5)                  
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t IQy                                                            (P2.13)   
  
          This is the multi period lot sizing problem for the vendor as discussed in the IS-V 
model, but now vitq  in equality (2.5) is replaced by itd , resulting in P2.5. We can then find the 
optimal production periods and quantities using the Wagner-Within algorithm. The optimal 
values vtQ
* and vty
*  then become parameters for the replenishment problem, which is next 
discussed. 
Problem R: Using the optimal production periods and quantities found in Problem P, find 
the best replenishment policy by solving 
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it II ≤                                                         ti,∀                                       (2.7)       
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it RIIqy                                                                    (R2.13)                                
 
           Note that we introduced a new variable vtRI  in (R2.5) to determine the true value of 
the vendor’s inventory level. vtI in (P2.5) does not take into account the replenishment 
quantities that depends on customers’ requirements and their maximum inventory levels. 
          Problem R is not a difficult problem. We first identify the consecutive production 
periods and quantities from Problem P. For every two consecutive production periods, we 
can then use a simple algorithm to find the replenishment policy for each customer i:  
 
Initialize: Let t' and t'' be the two consecutive production periods considered, with t'   
                the first demand period. Let n be the total number of replenishments until t'.  
                From t=t' to t=t''-1, compute the following steps. Stop when updated t=t'' or  
                when t=12. 
 Step 1: Determine the replenishment quantity in period t 
             vitq = itd  + Extrat ,  where Extrat = Min (
MaxVMIc
itI , 1+itd +
MaxVMIc
itI 1+ ) 
 Step 2: Update the on-hand inventory in the next period:  
             Extrat = Extrat - 1+itd  
 Step 3: Evaluate the value of Extrat   
             if Extrat  < 0, n = n+1, 1+itd = 1+itd - Extrat , t = t+1, go to Step 1 
             if Extrat  ≥  0, t = t+1, go to Step 2 
       Once we solve Problem R, the optimal replenishment quantities vitq
* become parameters 
for the transportation problem, which we will detail now.  
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Problem T: Using the optimal replenishment quantities, determine the transportation 
decisions by solving 
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*** α                         t∀                                                  (T2.8)                 
ststs xyb ≤−1                                                      ts,∀                                        (2.9) 
stsst ybx ≤                                                        ts,∀                                         (2.10) 
1≤∑
∈Ss
sty                                                          t∀                                            (2.11) 
00 =b ;    { } 0;1,0 ≥∈ stst xy                                                                                    (T2.13) 
 
         When we know the optimal replenishment quantities vitq
* , we can simply determine the 
transportation quantity (∑
s
stx ' ) for every period using equation (T2.8). That quantity also 
identifies the associated transportation segment.  
 
        Finally, we calculate the total cost of production, replenishment and transportation in 
Method 1, using the optimal solutions found in problems P, R, and T: 
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**            (TCM1)                 
 
        Note that the true value of vendor’s inventory level vtRI  is used to calculate the total 
cost of production. Having analyzed the P-R-T decomposition method, we can now easily 




Method 2: P-RT 
Solve P separately, and R and T together [decompose by constraint set (2.5)]. 









v ySIh   
s.t.  (2.2), (P2.5), and (P2.13) 
 




















stssts xcyf  
s.t. (2.3), (2.4), (R2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (R2.13), (2.8) - (2.11), (T2.13) 
 
Total cost of Method 2 can be calculated in the same way used for Method 1 [refer to 
equation (TCM1)]. 
 
Method 3: PR-T 
Solve P and R together, and T separately [decompose by constraint set (2.8)]. 
























v yyfa ** )1()( α  
s.t. (2.2) - (2.7), (P2.13), and (R2.13)  
 





stssts xcyf  
s.t. (T2.8), (2.9) - (2.11), (T2.13) 
        Using the optimal values of variables found in problems PR and T, the total cost of 
Method 3 can be calculated in the same way as for vVMITC  [refer to equation (2.1)]. 
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Method 4: PRT 
The model under this method is the same as for the model VMI-V ( vi
*α  values from Heuristic 
Part1 are of course set as parameter values).  
 
        Computational requirements of these methods reveal the tradeoff between finding a 
good solution the cost minimization problem and the time required to find that solution. For 
example, Method 1 is easiest to solve, but is anticipated to generate the worst solution. 
Numerical examples in Section 7 will contrast the four methods in terms of their solution 
quality and the time required to find a solution. But let us first look at the C&VMI case.  
 
5.6 Consignment and Vendor Managed Inventory (C&VMI) 
         C&VMI is an alternative sourcing option to VMI where now the vendor, in addition to 
managing her customer’s replenishments, assumes ownership of goods at the customer’s 
premises until they are used. Although the customer pays physical storage cost ( csih ) of those 
goods, it is the vendor who pays for opportunity cost of inventory stored at the customer.  
         Therefore, as opposed to VMI, now it may not be optimal for the vendor to replenish 
the customer to the greatest extend possible in a given period. The vendor’s model under 
C&VMI is very similar to VMI-V. As we will see, the two differences are an extra term in the 
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Subject to  




it II ≤                                    ti,∀                                                                      (CV2.7)   
(2.8) - (2.11)                        transportation constraints 
(2.12) - (2.13)                      starting/ending conditions and variable types 
     
           Note that in (CV2.7), we use the maximum level of inventory set by Ci for C&VMI 
( MaxCVMIcitI ), instead of 
MaxVMIc
itI  employed in the inequality (2.7) in the VMI-V model. The 




_  if 
v
iα =0, and it is 
c













otherwise.   
 
         As in Section 5, the vendor has to make four sets of decisions when C&VMI is an 
option: C&VMI (the best set of customers with which to implement C&VMI), production, 
replenishment, and transportation. Assume for a moment that there is a single customer, and 
there is no transportation question. The remaining problem of production and replenishment 




















i yfaaIh )( . 
The resulting replenishment quantities are optimal for the vendor, yet they may not be so for 
the customer who still has to pay csih per unit of inventory and 
cs
ia  for every order. Then, it is 
in the best interest of customer i to set a maximum inventory level when the vendor 
replenishes on behalf of him under C&VMI. The Imax iC -VMI model that we proposed for 
VMI can be modified to find those Imax levels:  
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i Ih                                                                    (CV2.14) 
Subject to: 














_)(                                              (CV2.17) 
MaxCVMIc
itI  = 
c
itI                                                                   (CV2.19) 
(2.18), and (2.20) 
 
The algorithm that was developed for ImaxCi –VMI can also be used to determine the Imax 
levels under C&VMI.         
 
Lagrangian Relaxation 
          Lagrangian relaxation is a widely used method to solve large-scale MIP problems. The 
underlying idea in this method is to obtain smaller problems (that are easier to solve) by 
means of relaxing some sets of constraints. The relaxation generates a lower bound (in a 
minimization problem) which in general outperforms the LP lower bound. The reader is 
referred to Fisher (1981) and Pirkul and Jayaraman (1998) for detailed discussions of the 
method.  
         Lagrangian relaxation has been applied to dynamic lot sizing problems by several 
researchers. Examples include Thizy and Van Wassenhove (1985), Trigeiro (1987), Diaby 
and Martel (1993), Millar and Yang (1994), and Jans and Degraeve (2004). In those studies, 
it is generally the capacity constraints that are relaxed. Our model structure, however, is quite 
different from their DLSP formulations. First of all, we have four sets of decisions (C&VMI 
or not, production, replenishment, and transportation) in one model. Moreover, we have 
inventory restrictions specified by customers. Finally, we use an LTL formulation for 
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transportation, which is more realistic, and which includes not only a fixed cost per shipment 
but also a variable cost per unit.       
        We will employ Lagrangian relaxation to find a good lower bound to the model CVMI-
V. Constraint set (2.8) will be relaxed to obtain two sub-problems, one for transportation, and 
the other for production and replenishment together. Note that, as discussed in Section 5, we 
could further decompose the latter into two, separating production and replenishment 
problems. However, this would worsen the lower bound obtained. 
         Let tλ be the Lagrange multipliers for the constraint set (2.8). In light of the preceding 
discussion, the CVMI-V problem is decomposed into the following two sub-problems. 
 
Sub Problem 1 (SP1): Production and Replenishment  
 
























































































































Sub Problem 2 (SP2): Transportation   
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sty                                                            t∀                                            (2.11) 
 
00 =b ;  { } 0;1,0 ≥∈ stst xy  
 
          When we fix tλ , we can find solutions to SP1 and SP2, and determine TCSP1 + TCSP2, 
which gives us a Lagrangian lower bound. To update the values tλ  and to find a Lagrangian 
upper bound, we use cutting plane approach of Kelly (1960). We define a Master Problem 
(MP) that takes the optimal solution of production, replenishment, and transportation 
variables from SP1 and SP2, and generates new Lagrange multipliers, to be used in SP1 and 
SP2. Employing this iterative approach, the algorithm terminates when the Lagrangian lower 
and upper bounds converge. The solution is then a lower bound to CVMI-V.  
 
Master Problem (MP) 
         The sum of the objective functions for the sub-problems generates a Lagrangian lower 
bound. In each iteration k, the master problem selects the maximum of those lower bounds. 
Two new constraints, one for each sub problem, are then added to the master problem (see 





Max     1θ  + 2θ                                                                                                                (MP1.1) 



















































*αλ                       (MP1.2) 
 













stkt xλ                                                             (MP1.3) 
 
The Lagrangian relaxation explained above gives us a lower bound for the CVMI-V model. In 
what follows, we devise a heuristic to find an upper bound to that model.  
 
Upper-Bound Heuristic 
         SP1 solves the production and replenishment problems together. The quantity shipped 
in any period must be the same as the total amount replenished to all customers in that 
period. Lagrangian relaxation furnishes the values of replenishment quantities that are also 
used to find the best lower bound to the model. To construct a feasible solution to CVMI-V, 












*** α . 
            By the “optimality gap” of C&VMI, we shall mean the percentage difference between 
the best lower bound found by the Lagrangian-relaxation method and the upper bound 
determined by the heuristic. We test the performance of the relaxation and the heuristic in 32 
large scale problems. Results of those, as well as numerical examples in connection with the 
models we developed in this paper, are presented in the next section.   
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5.7 Numerical Analyses  
         Various computational results are provided here to gain further insights. The first set of 
examples concerns the impacts of the maximum-inventory levels set by customers. For a 
small number of customers (up to six), we then compare and contrast exact solutions to cases 
IS, VMI, and C&VMI. Using that same set, we test our heuristics developed for the VMI-V 
model. Finally, we obtain lower and upper bounds for the CVMI-V model in 32 large-size 
problems.  
         We coded all of our models in GAMS 20.5, and employed CPLEX 7.5 as the MIP 
solver. The machine used for computations had an Intel Pentium M 1.6 GHz processor and 
512 SD RAM.  
         While setting values to production and replenishment parameters, we referred to 
various example-problems of Silver, Pyke and Peterson (1998). We generated parameters of 
each customer randomly: itd  = uniform (0, 200) units, 
cs
ia = uniform (5, 30) $/shipment 
received, coia = uniform (10, 45) $/order, 
c
ih = uniform (0.6, 2) $/unit. We set 
v
a = 
$15/shipment released, vS = $ 300 /production run, vh =  $ 0.6/unit. We assumed that coih is 
fixed to 85% of vh . Furthermore, the quantity segmentation and cost parameters in our 
transportation models are based on the example problem in Swenseth and Godfrey (2002). 
Each example is 12 periods in length. There are five transportation-quantity segments in all 
examples except the Lagrangian-relaxation test problems.  
        In six examples we tested the impacts of the customers’ maximum inventory levels 
allowed in VMI and C&VMI agreements. Each of those examples included six customers. 
Results are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.    
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       Six other examples were solved to compare and contrast the optimal solutions under IS, 
VMI, and C&VMI. We had only a single customer in the first, and increased the number of 
customers by one in each successive example. Tables 5.3 – 5.6 summarize the findings.  
       Those same six examples served to compare the Heuristic Methods 1-4 devised for 
Model VMI-V. Efficiency and effectiveness of those methods are highlighted in Tables 5.7 – 
5.9. Finally, the Lagrangian-relaxation approach that we introduced for Model CVMI-V was 
studied for 32 test problems, solutions of which are depicted in Table 5.10.      
 
            
  % Savings under VMI   
Customer's 
Imax level C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 V Total 
Total # of 
contracts 
Infinity -612 -444 -676 -323 -903 -729 73 -79 6 
itd  13 8 -4 25 -3 -15 1 2 6 
50% itd  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 








 0 18 0 9 2 0 14 12 6 
            
Table 5.1: Impacts of customers’ maximum inventory (Imax) level in VMI. 
 
 
         We see in Table 5.1 that if customers do not set an Imax level under VMI, their losses 
can be extremely high; the vendor’s savings are negligible compared to the total loss of all 
customers. Therefore, it is very important that each customer determine a maximum level for 
his stock under VMI. For a low value of Imax (e.g. 20% of itd ), it is  not beneficial for the 
vendor to offer VMI. Too high a level (e.g. MaxCVMIcitI
* ), on the other hand, may harm all 
customers. A choice such as itd  will harm at least some of them. The customers can get the 
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best out of a VMI opportunity when they set the “right” level of maximum inventory, which 
is MaxVMIcitI
* .     
          In C&VMI, however, a high level of Imax may not be disadvantageous for a given 
customer, since the vendor owns the goods at his facility. Yet, even though the vendor pays 
the opportunity cost of those goods, customers that have high physical storage costs may be 
harmed by the vendor’s replenishment decisions (e.g. C5 in Table 5.2). Therefore, it is 
important, for those customers in particular and for all customers in general, to set an Imax 
level for C&VMI.  
 
            
  % Savings under C&VMI   
Customer's 
Imax Level C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 V Total 
Total # of 
contracts 
Infinity 46 32 17 72 -11 39 21 26 6 
itd  0 0 38 0 0 0 1 2 1 
50% itd  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 








 41 0 27 52 29 41 4 11 5 
            
Table 5.2: Impacts of customers’ maximum inventory (Imax) value in C&VMI 
 
 
          Similar to the case of VMI, as the value of Imax decreases (Table 5.2), it becomes 
more difficult for the vendor to realize operational benefits, which implies fewer C&VMI 
agreements. When we compare the last two rows of Table 5.2, we see that MaxVMIcitI
*  results in 
a smaller number of agreements, lower savings for the vendor, but higher savings for the 
C&VMI customers. Although MaxVMIcitI
*  under C&VMI seems to be a good option, it fails for 
C2. On the other hand, an Imax level of 
MaxCVMIc
itI
*  increases the vendor’s savings, and also 
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increases the number of C&VMI-customers. This means a more even distribution of savings 
among the customers.  
          Table 5.3 summarizes the cost comparisons for both the vendor and customers in three 
cases. We see that C&VMI is definitely a better option for customers than VMI. Yet, it may 
not be so for the vendor: she owns inventory at customers’ premises and pays the associated 
inventory costs under C&VMI. We observe that in a given example, the total number of 
agreements influence which type of agreement is more beneficial for the vendor. In 
Examples 4 and 6, the number of VMI agreements and the savings under VMI is greater. On 
the other hand, there are more agreements and higher savings under C&VMI in Examples 3 
and 5. When the number of VMI and C&VMI agreements is the same (Examples 1 and 2), 
VMI tends to be more beneficial than C&VMI for the vendor.    
 
    Costs ($) under IS 
Average % 
savings per 
customer % savings for V 
# of 
customers 
# of VMI 
contracts 




customer V VMI C&VMI VMI C&VMI 
1 1 1 493 4,469 0 3 2 1 
2 2 2 405 6,470 0 5 3 2 
3 2 3 435 8,062 5 7 8 13 
4 3 2 477 10,353 4 8 13 12 
5 3 4 572 12,002 1 3 8 12 
6 6 5 408 12,635 1 3 12 11 
              
Table 5.3: Percentage of total savings in six examples that are solved optimally 
 
         Observing the cost breakdowns of customers under different cases (Table 5.4), we see 
that total ordering costs are far greater than total inventory costs under IS (note that we 
aggregate the costs of all customers to perform the analysis here). Of course, the assumed 
values of parameters determine that breakdown; however, we are only concerned with the 
impacts of VMI and C&VMI, given the costs under IS. Then, we note that those two 
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agreements increase the percentage of inventory costs for customers. This indicates that most 
of their savings come from efficiencies in ordering. We also see that customers prefer 
C&VMI to VMI, since that the former provides additional savings in inventory (i.e., 
percentage of inventory costs is in general lower under C&VMI than VMI).  
 
  IS VMI C&VMI 
# of 
customers Ordering Inventory Ordering Inventory Ordering Inventory 
1 91 9 26 74 27 73 
2 95 5 24 76 24 76 
3 87 13 56 44 57 43 
4 87 13 44 56 65 35 
5 90 10 56 44 52 48 
6 93 7 41 59 56 44 
             
Table 5.4: Cost breakdown (in %) of customers in all cases (aggregated for customers) 
 
        Table 5.5 depicts the production (P), replenishment (R), and transportation (T) cost 
breakdown of the vendor in the three cases considered. As the number of customers increases 
under IS, one sees an obvious decrease in the percentage of P costs, and an increase in the 
percentage R.  
 
  IS VMI C&VMI 
# of 
customers P R T P R T P R T 
              
1 41 11 48 39 14 47 38 17 45 
2 35 11 54 33 15 52 31 17 52 
3 31 11 58 30 15 55 27 26 47 
4 27 16 57 29 22 49 27 25 48 
5 27 15 58 27 22 51 26 28 46 
6 27 19 54 29 25 46 25 28 47 
              
Table 5.5: Cost breakdown (in %) of vendor in all cases  
 
        It is observed in Table 5.5 that compared to IS, VMI helps the vendor achieve 
economies of scale in production and distribution, although the percentage of the costs R 
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increases. The same argument is true for C&VMI, but now the impacts are greater (that is, 
the percentage of costs P and T is lower, and the R cost is higher compared to VMI).    
        
  Computation Times (in seconds) 
# of 
customers IS-C IS-V VMI-V CVMI-V 
1 0.9 1.5 3.1 5.4 
2 0.9 1.5 4.5 4.8 
3 2.25 1.5 6.9 18.3 
4 2.55 1.5 8.4 16.8 
5 1.5 1.8 16.5 29.7 
6 3 4.5 41.7 217.5 
       
Table 5.6: Computation times for six example problems, solved optimally. 
 
 
        The computation times included in Table 5.6 serve as a benchmark for the relative 
difficulty of finding a solution to our models. We see that the CPU time to solve a CVMI-V 
model always exceeds the solution time required for VMI-V. As the problem size increases, 
the absolute CPU gap between those two tends to increase, becoming very high when there 
are six customers.  
         The remaining tables concern the heuristic methods we proposed for solution of VMI 
and C&VMI models. In Table 5.7, we present the performance of Method 4, employed in our 
heuristic developed for VMI. Recall that the first part of that heuristic initially selects VMI-
customers. Method 4 in the second part then solves the remaining problem of coordinated 
production, replenishment and transportation together.  
          We notice that the number of agreements found by part one of the heuristic is greater 
than or equal to the optimal number of agreements in all examples (see the first two columns 
of Table 5.7). This makes sense, since the optimal solution considers all VMI alternatives, 
but eliminates some: Economies of scale can be achieved by selecting fewer customers for 
VMI, and adjusting their replenishments and the transportation to non-VMI customers. As a 
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result, part one of the heuristic finds an upper-bound for the number of agreements. Solving 
the remaining problem of P, R, and T together by Method 4, one sees that the gap between 
that upper-bound and the exact solution is very low (Table 5.7). Commparing CPU times, we 
see that the heuristic saves more time as the number of customers increases (in Example 6, 
the computation time required to solve the heuristic’s part one and two is around 14 times 
less than finding an optimal solution to the VMI-V model).      
total # of 
agreements 
% Gap between costs:                              
100(opt H – opt E) / opt E  
CPU time
ratio  
E H Prod Rep Trans Total Cost cpu(E)/cpu(H) 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1.3 
2 2 0 0 0 0 1.7 
2 3 0.02 0.13 -0.01 1.98 1.5 
3 4 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.73 2.5 
3 5 -0.02 0.16 -0.01 2.68 7.9 
6 6 0 0 0 0 13.9 
Table 5.7: Exact versus Method 4 (heuristic) solution of VMI. E: Exact, H: Heuristic, opt: 
optimal objection function value. 
 
 
         Having shown that part one of the heuristic performs reasonably well, let us now 
compare the decomposition methods proposed for solving the remaining problem of 
coordinated production, replenishment and transportation. Since Method 4 solves P, R and T 
together without any decomposition, it is the base method to which other approaches 
involving decomposition can be compared to evaluate their performances. Method 3 solves P 
and R together and T separately, whereas Method 2 solves P separately and R and T together. 
Method 1 decomposes the problem into three as P, R, and T and solves each separately. Also 
remember that in any case, we employ the hierarchical solution approach where P comes 






VMITC   ( $ ) % Gap compared to Method 4 
# of 
customers Method 4 Method 3 Method 2 Method 1 
1 4,389 0 0.1 0.1 
2 6,262 0 0.4 0.4 
3 7,942 0.3 2.4 2.8 
4 9,075 5.1 10.3 11.3 
5 11,293 5.4 12.4 12.4 
6 11,148 9.8 10.5 10.6 
        
Table 5.8: Comparison of heuristic methods 1-4 in terms of the vendor’s total cost 
 
 
          We see (Table 5.8) that Method 3 performs very well when compared to the methods 
two and one, and yields a total cost of VMI which deviates from optimality by at most 9.8 
percent (but still less than the total cost under IS). Method 2 performs only slightly better 
than Method 1 in some examples, leading to the conclusion that the performance of one over 
the other is negligible. It is important to note that, as opposed to Method 3, these two 
methods may not always provide a total cost still lower than that of IS. In example 5, the 12.4 
% gap for Methods 2 and 1 leads to a total cost exceeding the total cost under IS. Finally, we 
remark that Method 3 performs well in determining replenishments costs, but poorly for the 
costs of transportations. Methods 1 and 2 do well in production, yet replenishment and 
transportation costs are very high.  
          Comparing Methods 1-3 in terms of computation times (Table 5.9), Method 1 clearly 
fastest. Method 3 takes more solution time than Methods 1-2 (but performs better, as 
revealed in Table 5.8). However, the former is still less time-consuming than Method 4. 
These results also justify the reasoning in Lagrangian relaxation, which we used to separate 




CPU time (in 
seconds) CPU-time ratio of Method(n)/Method4 
# of 
customers Method 4 Method 3 Method 2 Method 1 
1 2.4 0.87 0.73 0.66 
2 2.6 0.88 0.74 0.68 
3 4.6 0.91 0.8 0.77 
4 3.4 0.9 0.77 0.73 
5 2.1 0.86 0.71 0.63 
6 3 0.89 0.76 0.71 
        
Table 5.9: CPU time comparison of heuristics methods 1-4 
  
 
          Table 5.10 presents the results of 32 test problems solved by the Lagrangian relaxation 
method we used for Model CVMI-V. The table includes the problem sizes (indices i and s), 
percentages of cost breakdown in each problem, LP lower bound, heuristic upper bound, and 
optimality gap (all comparisons assume that the lower bound obtained from Lagrangian 
relaxation is fixed at 100%), and the computation times (in seconds) required to solve each 
problem.   
          We see in those 32 problems that the LP bound varies between 41% and 49%, which 
indicates that the Lagrangian relaxation performs well in finding a better lower bound. The 
percentage gap is around 6.4 at most, and lower than 3.0 in majority of the problems. This 
indicates the good quality of the heuristic solution, with very reasonable upper bounds. SP1 
requires the greatest amount of CPU time, followed by SP2, MP, and the heuristic. Total time 
required to solve a problem varies between two and six minutes. 
         This concludes our numerical analysis. In the next section, we will provide a summary 










Bound =100)    CPU TIMES (in 10*seconds) 
Pro. 
# i S Prod. Repl. Trans. LP Heur. 
% 
GAP SP1 SP2 MP Heur. TOTAL 
1 15 5 28 14.3 57.7 44.0 102.4 2.4 23.46 0.6 0.29 0.02 24.35 
2 16 5 26.8 14.8 58.4 44.5 102.3 2.3 22.69 0.55 0.29 0.02 23.53 
3 17 5 25.6 15.6 58.8 43.9 101.9 1.9 29.21 0.79 0.21 0.02 30.21 
4 18 5 25 15.3 59.7 45.6 101.8 1.8 20.63 0.67 0.41 0 21.71 
5 19 5 24.3 15.6 60.1 45.5 101.8 1.8 19.71 0.64 0.26 0.02 20.6 
6 20 5 23.8 15.5 60.7 47.2 101.8 1.8 19.08 0.63 0.24 0.02 19.95 
7 21 5 22.6 16.2 61.2 46.4 101.5 1.5 15.74 0.47 0.21 0.02 16.42 
8 22 5 22.1 16 62 47.6 101.4 1.4 17.47 0.49 0.26 0.11 18.22 
9 23 5 21.8 16.1 62.1 48.8 101.4 1.4 15.29 0.46 0.2 0.02 15.94 
10 24 5 20.4 16.3 63.3 47.8 101.3 1.3 17.6 0.46 0.18 0.09 18.24 
11 25 5 19.7 16.1 64.2 47.9 101.3 1.3 16.5 0.41 0.18 0.03 17.1 
12 26 5 19.2 16 64.7 49.1 101.2 1.2 16.12 0.38 0.11 0.11 16.6 
13 27 5 18.3 16.7 65.1 48.5 101.2 1.2 18.17 0.47 0.18 0.11 18.83 
14 28 5 17.6 17.2 65.2 48.1 101.1 1.1 22.28 0.36 0.17 0.09 22.81 
15 29 5 17.4 17.3 65.2 49.1 101.1 1.1 20.11 0.47 0.24 0.09 20.83 
16 30 5 16.8 17.2 66 49.1 101.1 1.1 17.46 0.43 0.21 0.09 18.1 
17 15 6 28 14.3 57.7 41.9 106.4 6.4 21.44 0.65 0.26 0.02 22.34 
18 16 6 26.8 14.8 58.4 42.3 106.3 6.3 21.54 0.64 0.24 0 22.42 
19 17 6 25.6 15.6 58.8 41.8 106.0 6.0 30.18 0.52 0.24 0.09 30.93 
20 18 6 25 15.3 59.7 43.4 106.0 6.0 19.89 0.61 0.26 0.02 20.76 
21 19 6 24.3 15.6 60.1 43.3 106.0 6.0 24.91 0.47 0.2 0 25.58 
22 20 6 23.9 15.5 60.5 45.0 105.6 5.6 19.88 0.69 0.15 0.09 20.72 
23 21 6 22.9 16.4 60.8 44.2 104.5 4.5 18.05 0.38 0.15 0.03 18.58 
24 22 6 22.5 16.3 61.2 45.3 103.7 3.7 22.63 0.38 0.21 0.11 23.22 
25 23 6 22.2 16.4 61.4 46.6 103.8 3.8 18.38 0.39 0.15 0.03 18.92 
26 24 6 20.8 16.6 62.6 45.6 103.6 3.6 19.24 0.32 0.18 0.06 19.74 
27 25 6 20.3 16.6 63.1 45.7 102.5 2.5 19.4 0.35 0.21 0.03 19.95 
28 26 6 19.9 16.6 63.5 46.8 102.2 2.2 17.36 0.43 0.17 0.09 17.96 
29 27 6 19 17.4 63.6 46.2 101.5 1.5 18.47 0.24 0.24 0.08 18.95 
30 28 6 18.3 17.9 63.8 45.8 101.4 1.4 22.71 0.77 0.2 0.09 23.67 
31 29 6 18.1 18.1 63.8 46.7 101.4 1.4 19.54 0.35 0.14 0.09 20.02 













Table 5.10: Lagrangian relaxation results for 32 test problems 
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5.8 Summary and Conclusions 
         In this paper, we investigated a supply chain composed of a single vendor and multiple 
customers who face time-varying external demand. In the traditional way of doing business, 
each and every customer replenished from the vendor, and the vendor optimized her costs 
independently. We modeled the vendor’s and the customers’ dynamic lot sizing models as an 
MIP, and found the optimal values of their decision variables.  
         We then proposed that the vendor may decrease her costs if she implements VMI with a 
subset of customers. We formulated an MIP model for VMI so that the vendor could select 
the right set of VMI-customers, and could optimize her production, customer-replenishment, 
and transportation processes. To solve the model developed, we introduced a heuristic with 
two parts. The first decided the best set of customers with which to implement VMI. The 
second part included four methods to solve the remaining problem of integrated production, 
replenishment, and transportation. These three operational activities could be decomposed 
into two or more separate problems, as suggested by several of the methods.  
          As for customers, we showed how important it is that they set maximum inventory 
levels when VMI is an option. We proposed a model to find the optimal value of those levels, 
and an algorithm to solve it.  
          Afterwards, we analyzed C&VMI in Section 6 as an alternative to VMI. Under this 
agreement, the vendor paid the opportunity cost of goods stored on the premises of any 
C&VMI-customers. The model we formulated for the vendor under C&VMI was very 
similar to the one under VMI, yet it proved more difficult to solve. We then used Lagrangian 
relaxation, with the cutting-plane approach of Kelly (1960), to find a good lower bound on 
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the solution. We devised a heuristic to obtain an upper bound, which generated reasonable 
optimality gaps. 
          Under C&VMI, it was not as crucial as in VMI that a customer specify a maximum 
level of inventory that the vendor could employ. Nevertheless, we showed that it is in a 
customer’s best interest to do so. We modified for C&VMI the maximum-inventory-level 
model developed for VMI. Both models could use the same solution algorithm.  
         We can derive several managerial insights based on our analytical and numerical work. 
First of all, success of VMI for a customer depends on the maximum inventory level he 
allows. Too low a value results in no VMI agreement, hence the customer loses the chance to 
reduce his costs. Too high a value, on the other hand, likely increases his costs compared to 
the traditional way of doing business, causing VMI to fail. 
         Under C&VMI, since the vendor owns the goods replenished to the customer, that level 
of inventory is not as important as it is under VMI. Customers with high physical-storage 
costs, however, should be careful about the large quantities the vendor may prefer to ship. In 
any case, a customer would eliminate the possibility of losing money under C&VMI if he 
sets maximum inventory levels beforehand. 
         Our results show that, for any customer, C&VMI is definitely a better option than VMI. 
This is true for the vendor only when the number of C&VMI agreements can exceed the 
number of VMI agreements in a given setting. In any other case, the vendor saves more 
under VMI. However, the difference in savings between the two agreements tends not to be 
large. Therefore, the vendor may offer C&VMI to those customers less willing to accept 
VMI.     
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           We can also provide conclusions on the heuristics proposed and employed in this 
paper. The first part of the heuristic developed for the vendor’s model under VMI separated 
from the rest of the model the decisions concerning whom to offer VMI. Numerical examples 
reveal that solutions found by that heuristic form an upper bound on the exact solution, and 
the optimality gap is not high.  
        The four methods we proposed to solve the second part of the heuristic for integrated 
production (P), customer-replenishment (R), and transportation(T) can be compared within 
themselves. In three of those methods, we decomposed that integrated problem into sub-
problems as P-R-T, P-RT and PR-T, where a dash indicates the separation. Computational 
testing showed the obvious tradeoff between getting a solution and spending more time to get 
a good solution. The separation PR-T clearly outperforms the others in finding a good 
solution, but does not consume much more time in doing so.  
         For the vendor’s model under C&VMI, Lagrangian relaxation decomposed the problem 
into two, again as PR-T. When compared to LP bounds, the relaxation performed well within 
reasonable times. The heuristic that we developed could also be executed quickly to find a 
good upper bound. The relaxation method and heuristic solution yielded acceptable results, 
as revealed by the optimality gap. 
         Future research could investigate additional heuristic methods for the C&VMI problem 
either in the same setting, or when there are multiple products. An extension of the latter 
might include a customer who wishes to select VMI, C&VMI or Consignment Inventory 
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     We have investigated various supply-chain sourcing practices in three essays. The first 
essay included VMI and central decision making for a single vendor and customer under 
stationary demand. The second evaluated CI and C&VMI in the same setting. The third 
considered VMI and C&VMI in a supply chain composed of a vendor and multiple 
customers who face time-varying but deterministic demand. In all the essays, the traditional 
way of doing business was used as a base case. 
    VMI was the main theme of Essay 1. With that agreement, the vendor could make 
replenishment decisions on behalf of the customer, but would incur the cost to issue an order. 
The three possible outcomes of VMI are an efficient, inefficient, or a potentially efficient 
system. There are no system-wide cost savings in an inefficient system. Both the vendor and 
customer are better of if the system is efficient. In a potentially efficient system, only one 
party is better off, yet there are system-wide cost savings. Central decision making, on the 
other hand, would provide the best possible system-wide cost.  
          Some general conditions as to what type a system VMI creates were discussed in 
Essay1. Our analyses indicate, in many instances, that either the customer alone or the 
vendor alone captures the savings generated by VMI. Even so, a change from independent 
decision making is often worthwhile.  
    In a potentially-efficient system, the better-off vendor can compensate the customer to 
the point that his losses are neutralized. We used transportation-cost sharing and price 
discounts to demonstrate how that compensation could be achieved. We showed that when 
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the benefits are shared in the right way, a potentially efficient system can be turned into an 
efficient one.  
    In the second essay, we initially compared CI with the base case (inventory sourcing) 
and obtained analytical conditions under which CI creates benefits for the vendor, the 
customer and the whole system. In contrast to the general belief that CI is beneficial only for 
the customer, our results reveal that it may be favourable for the vendor, too, depending on 
the costs of shipment, and who pays for transportation.  
   When a CI agreement results in a potentially efficient system, it can be turned into an 
efficient one through a price discount. We found the minimum and the maximum amounts to 
which the wholesale price may increase, such that the customer may accept to share his 
benefits with the vendor. When the system is inefficient under CI, the vendor can offer a 
C&VMI agreement to realize savings for her and for the system.   
         We showed the vendor can make use of C&VMI to improve her costs in areas in which 
she is inefficient. Although in general the vendor prefers C&VMI rather than CI, and the 
customer vice versa, we observed that C&VMI is more likely to generate system-wide cost 
savings.  
          In Essay 3, we investigated a supply chain composed of a single vendor and multiple 
customers under time-varying and deterministic demand. In the traditional way of doing 
business, each and every customer replenished from the vendor, and the vendor optimized 
her costs independently. We modeled the vendor’s and the customers’ dynamic lot sizing 
models as an MIP, and found the optimal values of their decision variables.  
         Through VMI, the vendor could achieve economies of scale in her operations. We 
formulated an MIP model for VMI so that the vendor could select the right set of VMI-
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customers, and could optimize her production, customer-replenishment, and transportation 
processes. A heuristic with two parts was introduced to solve that model. The first part 
decided the best set of customers with which to implement VMI. The second included four 
methods to solve the remaining problem of integrated production, replenishment, and 
transportation. These three operational activities could be decomposed into two or more 
separate problems, and solved hierarchically.   
          Customers could guarantee at least not to be worse off under VMI when they set the 
right levels of maximum inventory. We proposed a model to find the optimal value of those 
levels, and an algorithm to solve it.  
          C&VMI was analyzed in a separate section of the third essay. The vendor’s model 
proposed for this agreement was more difficult to solve compared to the VMI model. We 
then used Lagrangian relaxation, with the cutting-plane approach of Kelly (1960), to find a 
good lower bound on the solution. We devised a heuristic to obtain an upper bound, which 
generated reasonable optimality gaps. As for the customers, it was not very crucial, as in 
VMI, for them to set maximum levels of inventory. Yet, we showed that it is in their best 
interest to do so. The algorithm used to find those levels under VMI would work under 
C&VMI as well.   
          The results obtained in Essay 3 reveal that C&VMI is a better option than VMI for the 
customers. This is true for the vendor only when the number of C&VMI agreements can 
exceed the number of VMI agreements in a given setting. In any other case, the vendor saves 
more under VMI. However, the difference in savings between the two agreements tends not 
to be large. Therefore, the vendor may offer C&VMI to those customers less willing to 
accept VMI.     
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           In terms of the solution approaches used, the heuristic developed for the vendor’s 
VMI model performed well. The first part of the heuristic, which dealt with whom to offer 
VMI, found solutions which formed an upper bound on the exact solution; the optimality gap 
was not high. The second part handled the remaining problem of integrated production (P), 
customer-replenishment (R) and transportation (T). Among the three decomposition methods 
P-RT; PR-T; P-R-T (where a dash indicates the decomposition), which solved the 
subproblems hierarchically, PR-T performed the best in terms of finding a good solution.    
          The vendor’s model under C&VMI was solved using Lagrangian relaxation which 
decomposed that model into two as PR-T. When compared to LP bounds, the relaxation 
performed well within reasonable times. A simple heuristic could also be executed quickly to 
find a good upper bound. The relaxation method and heuristic solution yielded acceptable 
results, as revealed by the optimality gap. 
          Future research might consider a customer who needs to determine the proper sourcing 
method for various items purchased from different vendors. For example, CI is always 
beneficial for the customer without any change in the wholesale price. However, various 
suppliers could enforce a price increase when CI is offered. In that case, the customer could 
carefully select the CI-vendors to maximize her savings, or could consider VMI or C&VMI 
under which the vendor would offer different prices.  
         One can simulate the resulting models when end-consumer demand is uncertain. In 
settings where demand is more stable, it may be likely to find closed-form solutions. If this is 
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